Amalgamation of units still at risk

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As we have noted previously, the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“TCPA”) is clear that the conversion of a single unit into several units requires planning permission. Although the legislation is silent on amalgamation, it may too be a material change of use requiring planning permission (see our 13 May 2014 blog).

In the recent Cheyne Gardens appeal an Inspector dismissed an appeal against Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (“RBKC”)’s decision not to grant a certificate of lawfulness for works to amalgamate two flats into a single dwelling. Planning permission had been refused and the applicant argued that a Certificate should be granted on the grounds that there was no material change of use requiring planning permission.  The analysis centred on two questions:

1          Is the change of use ‘development’?  ap

The appellant argued that the proposals should not be treated as development on the basis of Section 55(2)(f) TCPA and Article 3(1) of The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987. Both provide that where a building is used for a purpose of any class specified in the schedule to that Order, the use of that building for any other purpose within the same class shall not be taken to involve development of land. In Richmond upon Thames v SSETR & Richmond upon Thames Churches Housing Trust [2000] this was confirmed as engaged where the combined units were already in a single occupation.

The Inspector refused to apply Section 55(2)(f) and Article 3(1) on the basis that the two flats in this case were in use as two separate dwellinghouses, each occupied by a single household or person. The revised position would be one unit occupied by a single household or person.  Whilst the new arrangement, by virtue of the amalgamation, would be used for one of the uses within Class C3, it would not be the self-same building in the before and after scenarios.  The amalgamation was therefore development capable of amounting to a material change of use.

2          Is the change of use material in planning terms?

Richmond established that the extent to which a particular use fulfils a legitimate or recognised planning purpose (in terms of a purpose relating to the character of the land) is relevant in deciding whether a change from that use is a material change of use.   In particular, the loss of a particular type of residential accommodation where that loss was resisted by specific policies.

RBKC put forward evidence that de-conversions and amalgamations were anticipated to result in the loss of 400 homes over a five year period. Set against that, London Plan Policy 3.3 imposes a minimum 10 year housing building target of 7,330 dwellings for RBKC, with an annual monitoring target of 733 homes.  The Inspector considered that the loss of one unit should be considered against the annual target.  Despite accepting that this would be an “almost infinitesimal change” (and the loss of the single unit was under the 5 unit threshold set in the RBKC policy) he nonetheless decided that it would “as a matter of fact and degree have a significant impact in planning terms” concluding that circumstances had “changed significantly” since the adoption of that policy.

So what?

The focus of recent amalgamation appeals has been on the materiality of the change, rather than the question of whether there has been a change of use. The decision reflects the approach applied by the High Court in June, quashing CLEUD and Section 78 appeals on the basis that the Inspector should have taken account of generalised housing need arguments despite the lack of a specific policy threshold.

Although there is real scope to achieve permission on the basis that the loss of supply is clearly de minimis, the Cheyne Gardens decision confirms that decision makers will continue to treat general housing supply policies as a basis for regarding small amalgamations as material even though more specific policies on such changes do not necessarily warrant it.  The difficulties of doing so in the absence of such policies are illustrated by the 77 Drayton Gardens decision, in which the Inspector refused to grant a CLEUD (on the basis that a material change had occurred by virtue of amalgamation of two units, treating the existence of restrictive policies as weighing on the ‘threshold’ question of whether a change of use had occurred). He nonetheless quashed the related enforcement notice and granted permission on the basis that evidence of housing need (including for larger units) and actual supply outweighed the conflict with the development plan.