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A legitimate expectation to what, exactly?

The Court of Appeal has considered whether the Secretary of State is required to give reasons for deciding not to ‘call in’ a planning application. In R (on the application of Save Britain’s Heritage) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2018], Save Britain’s Heritage (Save) challenged the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s (SoS’s) decision under s77 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 not to call in an application relating to the ‘Paddington Cube’ development. We consider the court’s findings and its implications.

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This article was first published in Property Law Journal (December 2018/January 2019) and is also available at www.lawjournals.co.uk.

Legislation not the ‘agent of change’

Supporters of the Planning (Agent of Change) Bill 2018-19 had been looking forward to its second reading in the House of Commons on 26 October 2018. On 10 September, however, the Bill was withdrawn.

Parliamentary bale out

Music/ cultural venues and pubs in particular will be disappointed. There will be no legal planning protection for existing such uses, which are often threatened by nearby noise-sensitive (i.e. residential) development.

It is not clear why the Bill was withdrawn. The Bill itself was not published (or, if it was, it was withdrawn shortly afterwards), so we do not know what we are missing.

Planning policies fill the gap?

The agent of change principle is, however, included in Paragraph 182 of the new NPPF, which provides:

Where the operation of an existing business or community facility could have a significant adverse effect on new development (including changes of use) in its vicinity, the applicant (or ‘agent of change’) should be required to provide suitable mitigation before the development has been completed.

The Paragraph 182 provision that the new use ‘should be required’ to mitigate is in itself strong, but it is subject to there being a ‘significant adverse effect’ – a high threshold. It does not necessarily preclude complaints to councils or, worse, nuisance claims.

The NPPF is highly material but will need to be applied flexibly. In practice, the effectiveness of the principle is likely to depend on development plan policies, planning officers and council members upholding it. This in turn depends in some cases on communities demonstrating the importance of music venues and pubs in their area. It also requires decision-takers to recognise the wider nuisance-sensitive uses that should benefit from protection against parachuting in, for example retail operations. The Draft London Plan Policy D12 helpfully unpacks some of these elements but is also artificially narrow, protecting ‘venues’ rather than the wider range of uses that make up diverse and, increasingly, intensified, city spaces.

However, regardless of any planning policy mitigation measures, there will always be a risk of a statutory nuisance claim. Legislation will be needed to deal with that problem, ideally providing a partial immunity to both existing and new cultural and entertainment facilities.

A reasoned approach

We look at a local planning authority’s duty to give reasons, in light of recent case.  In September 2016, the Court of Appeal ruled that Dover District Council had failed to give legally adequate reasons for its decision, against the advice of its planning officers, to grant planning permission for a controversial development partly in an area of outstanding natural beauty (AONB) (R (on the application of Campaign to Protect Rural England) v Dover District Council [2016]). This was one of several recent cases which have dealt with, and have generated some uncertainty about, the duty to give reasons.

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This article was first published in Property Law Journal (March 2018) and is also available at http://www.lawjournals.co.uk/

Regulation change to allow LPAs to sell land with benefit of planning permission granted to themselves

From 23 February 2018, an LPA will be able to grant itself planning permission and sell the relevant land with the benefit of that planning permission. This small statutory change has the potential to significantly bolster LPAs’ role in facilitating development and ensuring that it is comprehensively planned.

The Town and Country Planning General (Amendment) (England) 2018 (the Amending Regulations) will remove Regulation 9  from Town and Country Planning General Regulations 1992 (the 1992 Regulations), with the effect that planning permissions granted by LPAs to themselves  will now run with the land.

Currently, Regulation 9 provides that a planning permission (where applied for by an LPA on its own land) will be personal to the LPA and where applied for jointly, only for the benefit of LPA and the named applicant. This has severely impeded the ability of an LPA, having secured planning permission to then sell the land on with the benefit of that planning permission. This has had cost implications requiring more complex land structures to be put in place before applications for development proposals could be made.

Oddly, the Regulations do not apply to any planning permissions granted before 23 February 2018. Given that future consents will run with the land it is strange that past consents have not been similarly “liberated”.

The removal of Regulation 9 was proposed in last year’s Housing White Paper on the basis that it will save time that developers would otherwise spend securing planning permission in relation to land which they purchase from LPAs.

It should achieve this. Now the Government needs to make sure that the best consideration requirements are changed so that land can be sold on for the best use for the area rather than just for the best price.

Deliverability vs Delivery – Court of Appeal confirms NPPF approach

The Court of Appeal has clarified the meaning of ‘deliverable sites’ in the key housing land supply provisions of Paragraph 47 NPPF (5YHLS).  As well as emphasising the need for pragmatism when applying the NPPF, the judgment confirms the need to get timing right if challenges are to be made to the assumed rate of housing delivery.

Supply test in question

In St Modwen v SoS CLG, the developer challenged the housing trajectory put forward by the authority to satisfy the NPPF 47 requirement to show specific deliverable sites sufficient to provide five years worth of housing against objectively assessed need. NPPF Footnote 11 confirms that ‘deliverable’ means available now, offer[ing] a suitable location for development now, and […] achievable with a realistic prospect that housing will be delivered on the site within five years and […] viable.

The Inspector disagreed that sites without permission should be excluded.  She accepted that the rate of consents was likely to increase in light of the draft plan.  She acknowledged a distinction between deliverability and likelihood of delivery: ‘…it may well turn out that not all allocations currently identified as deliverable will in fact be delivered’. The submitted HLS figures were robust, because ‘the assessment of supply is distinct from that for delivery’.

The Secretary of State accepted the Inspector’s finding that there was a 5 year HLS and dismissed the two linked appeals.

Courts insist on common sense

The High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the argument raised in seeking judicial review of the decision that the SoS had misunderstood and misapplied the concept of ‘deliverability’.  He should, it was claimed, have considered what would ‘probably be delivered’.

The Court of Appeal disagreed that Ouseley J’s judgment in the High Court suggested that assessment of ‘what probably would be delivered’ is part of, not separate from, the assessment of deliverability.

Ouseley’s judgment – that the assessment of “deliverability” … is an assessment of the likelihood that housing will be delivered. [It] does not require certainty that the housing sites will actually be delivered’ (emphasis added) – simply reflected the distinction between the HLS figure required under the first part of NPPF47 and the ‘expected rate of delivery’ required for the trajectory under the second part.

The Court of Appeal once again went out of its way to criticise ‘unreal’ arguments on the meaning of NPPF policy, holding that:

  • there is a consistent and intentional distinction in the NPPF between ‘deliverability’ and the ‘expected rate of delivery’;
  • deliverability in footnote 11 concern sites’ capability of being delivered – not the certainty/ probability of delivery;
  • the appeal decision was being taken in light of NPPF49, engaging the question of demonstrable 5YHLS, not a question about the ‘the expected rate of housing delivery’.

So what?

The judgment serves to emphasise that:

  • there need only be a ‘realistic prospect’ of delivery for sites to be relied in within the 5YHLS;
  • challenges to the assumptions around the expected rate of delivery generally need to be taken up at the Local Plan examination stage;
  • Local planning authorities do not control the housing market. The NPPF recognises that.’

The last point underlines the fact that LPAs play a critical role, but are only one part of the housing delivery jigsaw. It is also illustrates how important the Housing Delivery Test will be, as a sense check on assumptions and progress, if it is introduced as promised in the Housing White Paper.