1. Skip to navigation
  2. Skip to content
  3. Skip to sidebar

Common Sense Needed to Flush Out SPD Abuse

The High Court has confirmed the need to tread a common sense path through the mire of the Local Plan regulations, in quashing a supplementary planning document (SPD) that strayed into Development Plan Document (DPD) territory in William Davis Ltd & Ors v Charnwood Borough Council [2017] EWHC 3006 (Admin) (23 November 2017).

Light Touch

SPDs escape the examination process needed for DPDs.  They are often seen as simply elaborating on existing policies.  The Town and Country Planning (Local Planning) (England) Regulations 2012 are more nuanced: SPDs are allowed to contain policy, but it must be justified and must not conflict with the adopted development plan (Reg 8(3)).  SPD policy cannot supersede development plan policy and is merely a material consideration.

Substance Over Style

Local Development Documents (LDDs) that have the characteristics listed in regulation 5 must (under reg 6) be prepared as Local Plans (i.e. DPDs).  SPDs are defined negatively (reg 2) as anything that is not a Local Plan. In practice, this means a document containing statements regarding “any environmental, social, design and economic objectives which are relevant to the attainment of the development and use of land encouraged by a [Local Plan]”.

The regime is messy and open to abuse where SPDs stray into Local Plan territory. SPDs cannot contain policy identifying development and use of land which the authority wishes to encourage, making site allocations or site allocation policies or setting development management to guide application decisions.

No Mercy

In Charnwood, Gilbart J quashed policies in a housing SPD.  The core strategy contained strategic policies with high level targets for housing types to meet demographic needs, with a “subject to viability” affordable housing target and a requirement that types, tenures and sizes of homes would be appropriate having regard to identified housing needs and character of the area. The SPD prescribed different percentages for all house sizes, and a 60-70% affordable housing requirement for some unit types.

The statements were quashed: they contained policies; and they clearly related to forms of development to be encouraged and imposed development management policies against which applications could be refused (or conditions to control unit mix imposed) (under reg 5). Although there was some legitimate SPD ‘guidance’ that did not save the offending policies (citing R (Skipton Properties Ltd) v Craven District Council [2017] EWHC 534 (Admin)).  They could only be adopted as a Local Plan (DPD), following examination.

Take Heed

The judgment emphasises several points that authorities and affected parties should pay attention to:

  • where an ‘SPD’ is promoted as a “stop gap” in the absence of  saved policies, by definition it cannot be supplementary (and is itself a primary policy assuming DPD status as in the Skipton case);
  • a housing mix policy which could lead to refusal on the grounds that the proposed mix is unacceptable (or an outline application condition imposing a particular mix) is a statement regarding the development of land and development management policy;
  • uncertainty arising from the “very poor” drafting of the Regulations should be dealt with in light of the “realities of development control” and the fundamental importance of robust and independent examination of the development plan;
  • viability impacts were material and had adopting the policies without consideration of those impacts was unlawful;
  • SPD should not be used for making an alteration to plan policy to address new evidence.

So what?

Authorities will need to be far more careful about the statements they include in what purport to be SPDs on issues such as housing mix and affordability but also density, height and other matters.  There is still a tendency to sneak swathes of untested, unjustified and ineffective policy in through the back door via dodgy SPDs.

The judgment comes when the Mayor of London’s Affordable Housing Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPG) document is under legal attack for having strayed into the realms of policy, despite being clearly stated not to constitute policy and arguably not to extending beyond the policies in the London Plan itself.

It remains to be seen whether that challenge will be recast as a challenge to specific decisions which – wrongly – treat the SPG’s contents as a policy or a fixed position (which often feels like it is the case).

Free-Standing Sustainable Development Assessment a Mistake

In Reigate and Banstead BC v SoS CLG [2017] EWHC 1562 (Admin), Lang, J quashed permission granted on appeal for development on greenfield land intended for release in the development plan only if needed to boost housing land supply (HLS).

The recently-adopted Local Plan provided for almost a 5 year HLS, constrained so as to be unable to meet full objectively assessed need (OAN). Despite its “urban area first” strategy, the Inspector worked on the basis that sustainable development should be approved in the absence of harm.  He found that there was not basis for dismissing it because the proposal would reduce the HLS shortfall against OAN over the plan period and would not significantly prejudice the spatial strategy given its scale (45 homes).

The authority challenged the decision on the basis that the Inspector had inverted the statutory requirement to determine the appeal in accordance with the development plan, subject to material considerations otherwise (s38(6) PCPA 2004).

The judgment identifies ten key propositions for NPPF14 cases, including:

  • The need to distinguish between local and national policies which describe what qualifies as sustainable development (e.g. NPPF 6, 7, 18 to 219) and policies that determine when a presumption in favour of such development arises.
  • That the NPPF 14 exhaustively defines when a presumption in favour of sustainable development can arise. There is no general presumption outside NPPF 14 (applying Trustees of the Barker Mill Estates v SoS CLG [2016] EWHC 3028 (Admin) and Cheshire East BC v SoS CLG [2016] EWHC 571 (Admin)). The Inspector could – in theory – have reached the same outcome by applying the s38(6) starting point but giving in efforts to close the OAN gap greater weight.  However, the judgment implies that in the absence of something significant – such as evidence that local housing stress had worsened substantially since the Local Plan was adopted – the decision would be have been doomed to the same fate.
  • One proposition seems out of kilter with the rest – that the NPPF14 presumption “does not extend to a proposal which conflicts with the development plan“. Although not relevant in Reigate, NPPF14 is explicit that the presumption does extend to such proposals where (1) the development plan is absent, silent or relevant policies are out‑of‑date and (2) any adverse impacts of granting consent would not significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits considered against NPPF policies in the round (and no specific restrictive NPPF policies apply – which should now include ‘related’ development plan policies following Suffolk Coastal District Council v Hopkins Homes Ltd & Onr [2017] 1 WLR 1865).

DCO Decision Confirms Heritage Approach

In R (on the application of John Mars Jones on his own behalf and on behalf of the Pylon The Pressure Group) v The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2017] EWHC 1111 (Admin), the High Court dismissed the judicial review of a Development Consent Order made under the Planning Act 2008 by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.  The Order authorised an overhead electricity line to wind farms following developer requests to connect to the network. The Claimant, whose Grade II* listed Tudor farm lay within 125 metres of the route, challenged the decision to make the Order on several grounds, including the treatment of heritage effects.

The Secretary of State was required to regard to two relevant policy statements under section 5 of the 2008 Act – Overarching National Policy Statement for Energy (EN-1) (“EN-1”) and the National Policy Statement for Electricity Networks Infrastructure (EN-5) (“EN-5”).  The policy statements together required careful consideration of the feasibility of alternatives to overhead lines and the protection of heritage assets. He was required to determined the Order application in accordance with them unless, among other things, satisfied that the adverse impact of the proposals would outweigh the benefits.  He was also required to have regard to the desirability of preserving listed buildings or their setting (under regulation 3 of the Infrastructure Planning (Decisions) Regulations 2010).

The Order was approved, on the basis that in the absence of substantial harm, there was no need for the disproportionate costs of undergrounding the cable section.

Dismissing the challenge, Lewis, J held on the main grounds that:

  • The  approach to heritage effects had been correct – identifying the scale of harm and then weighing the scheme benefits against, among other things, the heritage harm.
  • The regulation 3 duty had been complied with looking at the report and decision as a whole. There was no duty to consider alternatives not forming part of the Order scheme and the option of refusal had been properly considered.
  • Permanent extinguishment of private rights – despite the temporary nature of the Order -was not a principal controversial issue and did not require specific reasons to be given on it.
  • The fact that the weighing exercise was in a different part of the  part of the report to the assessment of heritage harm did not matter. It is worth noting that the limited (30 year) duration of the Order was accepted as minimising the impact on the setting of the listed buildings (being for period which would be insubstantial relative to the life of the buildings) and offering a sensitive approach to heritage effects.

Viability Decisions – Care Needed on ‘Market Value’ Assumptions

The recent Parkhurst Road appeal decision emphasises the importance of understanding how  land value expectation (and so the price for land) should reflect planning policy requirements.

The appeal decision dismissed the 96-home proposals for the disused Territorial Army centre on Parkhurst Road, Holloway on the grounds that it would not provide the “maximum reasonable” level of affordable housing, as required by the council’s core strategy. The appellants offered ten per cent affordable provision, reflecting a purchase price of £13.25 million (which, in light of nearby sales data, was said to be the market value for the site). The Inspector accepted the authority’s approach, starting with the site’s established use value (EUV) and applying a significant premium, to reach an overall benchmark nearly half that put forward (at which 34% provision was feasible).

Caution is needed on whether the decision is really a game-changer or just a reminder of home truths.

Benchmark, not Landmark

The decision is a benchmark, of existing policy, rather than a landmark in terms of a new approach. It shows a willingness to take policy and guidance at its word and treat land value as genuinely residual to policy requirements (even where they are expressed to be ‘subject to viability’).  It does not junk the comparable approach, nor does it undermine the use of either a substantial premium to Existing Use Value  (EUV Plus) or use of Alternative Use Value where appropriate to reflect the need for an incentive to release land.  It is a reminder of the need to critically examine evidence of comparable values to weed out those which failed to comply with policy in the first place (i.e. are not truly comparable).

It also illustrates the role that the Mayor’s Housing Supplementary Planning Guidance (March 2016) will play in London in clarifying that the outcome should rarely be different whether either the EUV Plus or the RICS market value basis is used properly.

Context is everything

The backdrop to this particular decision also matters. In a previous (2015) appeal, the Inspector’s finding that the price paid was broadly reasonable in light of ‘market signals’ (competing bids and comparables) resulted in a letter from the Government responding to the threat of legal proceedings by Islington acknowledging that the PPG’sunambiguous policy position” is “in all cases land or site value … should reflect policy requirements and planning obligations…”.

The 2017 decision adopts a more critical approach to giving effect to that, but is not really that different to other appeal decisions through the years which reflect the same fundamental point already flagged in the PPG (look back, for example, at the 2013 Holsworthy Showground decision) discounting price paid as an overbid against true market value.

Technical Pointers

Both the 2015 and 2017 decisions acknowledge the appropriateness of a viability Review. A 24 month ‘grace period’ was acceptable to avoid a pre-implementation Review but seeking a 22% margin at the Review stage when the effective profit on the 10% AFH offered at appeal was 18% was – sensibly – rejected on the basis that the development risk is already rewarded by the preserved return of 18%.

It is also significant that a requirement not to leave the homes empty for more than 3 months (under its adopted Preventing Wasted Housing Supply SPD, July 2015) was rejected on the basis of doubts about both the justification for, and the enforceability of, the obligation. The latter point should be scrutinised as a proper consideration in judging the reasonableness of the obligation – not least because it would suggest that the kind of obligations required by the St Ives Neighbourhood Plan could never be given effect.

Planning TV: Tweak CIL


The CIL Review Panel’s long awaited report: A new approach to developer contributions was published in February 2017.  A key recommendation is that the Government should replace the Community Infrastructure Levy with a hybrid system of a broad and low level Local Infrastructure Tariff (LIT) and Section 106 for larger developments.  We will have to wait a bit longer for the government’s response which is expected in Autumn 2017.

We spoke to Roy Pinnock, Partner at Dentons about the review and potential reform of CIL. His view on CIL: tweak it don’t trash it.

Dentons Planning TV is a new and innovative platform for engaging in and reacting to the latest developments in the dynamic world of planning. Its mission statement is simple: to provoke debate and facilitate engagement at all levels in the planning process.

Brought to you by Dentons and Citiesmode it draws on the knowledge of a core panel of experts from across the sector, supplemented with special guests hand picked for their particular expertise. From Greenbelt to Brownfield, national planning policy to local plan-making and everything in between, Dentons Planning TV provides a unique insight into the thoughts of those involved at the sharp end.

Update: When does a condition restricting use remove PD rights?

Last month we blogged on the High Court’s judgment in Dunnett, which refused to quash the Secretary of State decision not to grant a Certificate of Lawfulness in respect of the use of office to residential Permitted Development rights where a condition on the office consent was effective in excluding GPDO rights. The condition stated that “The use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained.”

The Court of Appeal has now upheld the High Court’s judgment.

The result? Uncertainty prevails.

Trump reigns

The Court of Appeal noted that there is no bar to (cautiously) implying terms into planning conditions: doing so is an objective, fact-dependent exercise in which the Court asks ‘what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole’ (applying Trump International ([2015] UKSC 74).

Deconstructing the condition

Against that backdrop, the Court of Appeal held:

  1. The words ‘and for no other purpose whatsoever’ were, in this case, enough not only to control the B use of the property, but also to exclude future reliance on PD rights. The wording that followed – ‘without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained’ (the “Tail”) – just made the exclusion ‘the more abundantly clear’.
  2. The Tail cannot sensibly include a planning permission granted through the GPDO. The appellant argued that it was necessary to read into the Tail ‘or the Secretary of State’ because of the unavoidable possibility of the Secretary of State granting planning permission on appeal against a refusal by the LPA. Once that is read in, the Appellant submitted, it must include Secretary of State decisions through the GPDO as well as Secretary of State decisions on appeal as there is no basis for including one but not the other. The Court rejected this: it is not necessary to imply ‘or the Secretary of State’ at all because appeal rights do not depend on conditions; they are conferred automatically by statute.
  3. Further, if the Court were to accept the appellant’s argument, the Tail would include all means of granting permission and would therefore have no limiting effect at all. The LPA could not have intended to include useless wording.
  4. The reason for the condition and the site’s planning history reinforced the findings above by reflecting the council’s intention to maintain close control over the site.

Comment – it depends

Unhelpfully, given Trump, implied meaning will always depend on context. That said, as a result of this judgment:

  • It will be very hard to show that stating that uses are ‘limited to’ a particular use will, alone, be enough to exclude PD rights.
  • Words such as ‘for no other purpose whatsoever’ will likely do the job, but ‘for no other purpose’ alone may hang in the balance.

The difficulty will be for wording that is more emphatic than ‘limited to’ but less emphatic than ‘for no other purposes whatsoever’.

It is not a great outcome for investors, who will have to puzzle over the endless and often pointless variations and contortions in condition wording pumped out by decision makers to understand what price planning freedom. A set of standard conditions embedded in the Planning Practice Guidance which make clear how PD rights should be dealt with and provide a level playing field would be welcome.

With thanks to Ralph Kellas for preparing the blog.

Planning controversies demand clear reasons

A flurry of decisions on reasons have underlined the need for care in explaining planning decisions, from delegated reports to sensitive areas. Our comprehensive guide to the Oakley green belt case and other decisions is here.

The decision in R (Campaign To Protect Rural England, Kent (CPRE)), v Dover District Council [2016] EWCA Civ 936 is on its way to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, it is worth looking into the Court of Appeal’s approach to the standard of reasons required of an authority granting permission for development of a scale “unprecedented in an AONB” in that case. The judgment confirms that reasons for approval may be required in planning matters where basic fairness demands it, despite the absence of a statutory duty, particularly where significant policy breaches are being entertained. It also highlights the benefits of dealing properly with the need for statements of reasons under the EIA regime.

Controversial proposals

The authority’s officers had recommended a less dense, but – according to its advisors – no less viable approach to delivering housing in the sensitive area.  Members rejected that approach on viability grounds and objectors challenged by judicial review on the basis of inadequate reasons.

No reasons required?

The defendant authority started from the position that there is no duty on planning authorities – unlike the Secretary of State – to give detailed reasons for the grant of permission (adopting the ‘light touch’ approach in R (Hawksworth Securities Plc) v Peterborough City Council & Ors [2016] EWHC 1870 (Admin)) where the standards applicable to an inspector’s decision on appeal were distinguished from merely an ‘administrative’ decisions by local planning authorities).

The Court of Appeal recognised that this approach “needs to be treated with some care. Interested parties (and the public) are just as entitled to know why the decision is as it is when it is made by the authority as when it is made by the Secretary of State.”  In the circumstances of Dover, several factors justified detailed reasons:

  • the nature of protective NPPF policies means that decisions to authorising development which will inflict substantial harm on an AONB must be accompanied by “substantial reasons”;
  • a departure from officers’ advice;
  • the applicability of the statutory duty to make a statement of reasons and mitigation under Regulation 24(1)(c) of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011.

Costly admin errors

The Committee minutes in question failed – against that standard – to give legally adequate reasons:

  • firstly, it was unclear whether members accepted their officers’ assessment of harm; if they did, they would have “opted to inflict irreversible harm on the AONB” on the limited material before them;
  • secondly, it was unclear whether they viewed viability issues as a mere risk, which would have made their obligation to address the issue of harm was “all the more acute”;
  • thirdly, it was not clear if they had applied a simple unweighted balance to AONB protections; and
  • finally, they had reached conclusions on visual screening which were “fragile at best and would have to be supported by reasoning a good deal more substantial than the sentence in the minutes”.

EIA goalie?

The judgment helpfully confirms that while the lack of a regulation 24 statement may not necessarily kill a decision where reasons are adequate on the record, it could save it where they are not.

The Supreme Court judgment, when it comes, should provide a definitive position on the basis and scope for reasons for approval. In the meantime, a little transparency and coherence for controversial decisions can only be a sensible approach.

When does a condition restricting use remove PD rights?

Article 3(4) of the GPDO 2015 provides that permitted development (PD) rights will not apply if they are ‘contrary to any condition imposed by any planning permission granted or deemed to be granted under Part 3 of the [TCPA 1990] otherwise than by this Order.’  Must such conditions refer explicitly to the GPDO? If not, what is enough?

Backstory

The Courts have held in some cases that conditions that do not expressly exclude PD rights do not implicitly restrict them (Carpet Décor (Guildford) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another (1981) 261 EG 56 and Dunoon Developments v Secretary of State and Poole Borough Council (1993) 65 P. & C.R. 101). The cases fall short of establishing that conditions cannot, legally, implicitly exclude PD rights:

  • In Carpet Décor, the High Court held that a condition excluding PD rights had to be ‘in unequivocal terms’. This suggests a strict approach, though arguably it does not definitively rule out the possibility of implicit restrictions.
  • In Dunoon, the Court of Appeal made several statements – some strict, some looser.  Indicating the strict approach, Farquharson LJ said: ‘The purpose of the General Development Order is to give a general planning consent unless such a consent is specifically excluded by the words of the condition.’ Indicating the looser approach, Farquharson LJ specifically addressed whether a preclusion of the GDO was ‘…to be implied from the words themselves, in the context in which they are used…’. He went on to consider whether the non-explicit wording of the condition was sufficiently ‘emphatic’, ‘conclusive’ or ‘wide’ to preclude the GDO. Sir Donald Nicholls VC, agreeing with Farquharson LJ , concluded that in this case there was ‘no explicit or implicit intention to negative development pursuant to any existing or future [GDO].’ These passages only make sense if implicit exclusion of PD rights is actually possible.

Who Dunnett?

In the first opportunity to revisit this in 2 decades, the High Court decision in Dunnett Investments Limited v SSCLG [2016] EWHC 534 (Admin) suggests that implicit exclusion of PD rights can work.

  • The claimant relied on PD rights to change from Class B1(a) offices to Class C3 dwelling houses. Its existing permission included a restrictive condition:

“1. This use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained.

REASON: “In order that the Council may be satisfied about the details of proposal due to the particular character and location of this proposal.”

  • The LPA failed to determine the claimant’s PD prior approval application and the claimant applied for a Certificate of Lawfulness (which the LPA refused, based on the condition).
  • The claimant challenged the decision, relying on Carpet Décor and Dunoon as requiring the strict approach (i.e. that the language must be explicit and unequivocal to exclude PD rights).

The Court rejected this, on the basis that:

  1. The second part of the condition serves no other purpose than to prevent the operation of the GPDO. “Without that meaning the second part is irrelevant to the condition”.
  2. The words ‘for no other purpose’ prohibit any other purpose including any other purpose otherwise permitted by the GPDO.
  3. The word ‘whatsoever’ is “emphatic and, in context, refers to any other use, howsoever arising or under any power. Read together, and considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, in my judgment, it is clear that the GPDO is excluded”.
  4. The words “without express planning consent from the local planning authority first being obtained” have no sensible meaning unless they remove GPDO rights.
  5. The reason for the condition confirmed that, due to the particular character and location of the site, any other use would need to be the subject of an express application.

The judgment treats the loose approach as ‘entirely consistent with the cases of Dunoon and Carpet Décor’.

Clear as mud

For the time being, the outcome reflects the prevailing uncertainty for landowners, developers and LPAs, because:

  • it is unclear which elements of the reasons at 1-5 above were decisive,
  • the outcome was said to be fact sensitive.

Dunnett has been appealed to the Court of Appeal and will be heard this month (March 2017). The Court of Appeal could reject the loose approach altogether. If, however, the Court confirms the principle of implicit exclusion of rights, it would be helpful if it clarifies:

  • the forms of wording which will do the job (and those that will not); or
  • whether the effect of the condition entirely depends on the wording read in the context of the reason and the condition as a whole.

In a period where PD rights are increasingly valuable, the outcome will be important.

With thanks to Ralph Kellas for preparing the blog and researching the cases.

Care needed in applying local green belt policies

In R (Lensbury Ltd) v Richmond-Upon-Thames London Borough Council [2016] EWCA Civ 814 the Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court and agreed to quash permission for a hydro-power installation at a weir on Metropolitan Open Land (MOL). The appellant hotel owner succeeded on the grounds that the authority had, in applying its own policies on MOL development, failed to apply the stricter London Plan policies.

London Green Belt

The London Plan gives MOL equivalent status to green belt (applying NPPF policies – i.e. inappropriate development should not be allowed unless there are ‘very special circumstances’ (VSC)). The local plan policies allowed the development to be classified as ‘appropriate development’ in a way that the London Plan policy did not. The authority considered only the local policies.

Failing to refer to the specific (London Plan) policy in the committee report which provided the rationale for the decision was not fatal when considering the extent of compliance with the development as a whole (under Section 38(6) Planning & Compulsory Purchase Act 2004). The analysis did, however, have to make clear that “a particular policy has been brought into account“.

VSC need to be clear

By failing to identify the development as inappropriate in the context of London Plan MOL policy, the authority had failed to ask whether VSC existed which justified the exceptional grant of planning permission. The S.38(6) duty – to determine in accordance with the development plan as a whole, or identify reasons for a different approach – had therefore not been discharged.

The judgment is a reminder that the Courts are pragmatic on the application of S.38(6). The duty does not require a mechanistic treatment of each policy (City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State for Scotland [1977] 1 WLR 1447).  An overall finding of “compliance or conflict” with the development plan as a whole is sufficient, whether express or implicit.

The judgment notes that the dilution of the London Plan approach by the local plan policy appeared to have been overlooked. One oddity of the case is that agreement between the parties that the two policies did not take precedence over each other does not appear to reflect S.38(4), which provides that where there is conflict the most recently adopted policy trumps the older one.

Daylight/ Sunlight Error Fatal To Permission

In Watt, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Hackney & Anor [2016] EWHC 1978 (Admin), the High Court quashed the grant of permission for a mixed use development likely to adversely affect sunlight reaching adjacent open land used by the neighbouring school for children’s play. The application had been considered on the basis the redevelopment of the vacant site would have enhanced the character and appearance of the conservation area.

Latent defects

The authority relied on a daylighting report addressing the extent of reduction in daylight to the play land at different times of year. A claim for judicial review was made on several grounds and independent assessment – carried out after the claim – identified flaws in the original report, exaggerating the existing levels of daylight and so understating (by a third) the effect of the new scheme on the play land.

The judge admitted the new report as part of a ground of claim alleging an error of fact. The defendant authority offered its own evidence in response, but – crucially – did not object to its admission.

Errors of fact can be fatal

The judgment confirms that the error of fact justified quashing the permission in the circumstances: there was a factual error which created a misleading picture; the fact was ‘established’, in the sense of being uncontentious; neither the appellant (nor his advisers) were responsible; and finally, the error played a material part in the reasoning (on the basis that it was impossible to say that had not done so, applying Simplex GE (Holdings) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1989) 57 P&CR 306).

Get your facts right

The daylight reaching the play area was above the relevant policy threshold with the correct analysis (just less far above than the original assessment had, wrongly, suggested). Despite the fact that the error may not have been decisive in the overall decision, though, the judge was prepared to quash the permission.  The judgment therefore confirms the risk that faulty technical work creates for planning decisions, even where the error itself is not decisive.