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Planning TV: Tweak CIL


The CIL Review Panel’s long awaited report: A new approach to developer contributions was published in February 2017.  A key recommendation is that the Government should replace the Community Infrastructure Levy with a hybrid system of a broad and low level Local Infrastructure Tariff (LIT) and Section 106 for larger developments.  We will have to wait a bit longer for the government’s response which is expected in Autumn 2017.

We spoke to Roy Pinnock, Partner at Dentons about the review and potential reform of CIL. His view on CIL: tweak it don’t trash it.

Dentons Planning TV is a new and innovative platform for engaging in and reacting to the latest developments in the dynamic world of planning. Its mission statement is simple: to provoke debate and facilitate engagement at all levels in the planning process.

Brought to you by Dentons and Citiesmode it draws on the knowledge of a core panel of experts from across the sector, supplemented with special guests hand picked for their particular expertise. From Greenbelt to Brownfield, national planning policy to local plan-making and everything in between, Dentons Planning TV provides a unique insight into the thoughts of those involved at the sharp end.

Update: When does a condition restricting use remove PD rights?

Last month we blogged on the High Court’s judgment in Dunnett, which refused to quash the Secretary of State decision not to grant a Certificate of Lawfulness in respect of the use of office to residential Permitted Development rights where a condition on the office consent was effective in excluding GPDO rights. The condition stated that “The use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained.”

The Court of Appeal has now upheld the High Court’s judgment.

The result? Uncertainty prevails.

Trump reigns

The Court of Appeal noted that there is no bar to (cautiously) implying terms into planning conditions: doing so is an objective, fact-dependent exercise in which the Court asks ‘what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole’ (applying Trump International ([2015] UKSC 74).

Deconstructing the condition

Against that backdrop, the Court of Appeal held:

  1. The words ‘and for no other purpose whatsoever’ were, in this case, enough not only to control the B use of the property, but also to exclude future reliance on PD rights. The wording that followed – ‘without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained’ (the “Tail”) – just made the exclusion ‘the more abundantly clear’.
  2. The Tail cannot sensibly include a planning permission granted through the GPDO. The appellant argued that it was necessary to read into the Tail ‘or the Secretary of State’ because of the unavoidable possibility of the Secretary of State granting planning permission on appeal against a refusal by the LPA. Once that is read in, the Appellant submitted, it must include Secretary of State decisions through the GPDO as well as Secretary of State decisions on appeal as there is no basis for including one but not the other. The Court rejected this: it is not necessary to imply ‘or the Secretary of State’ at all because appeal rights do not depend on conditions; they are conferred automatically by statute.
  3. Further, if the Court were to accept the appellant’s argument, the Tail would include all means of granting permission and would therefore have no limiting effect at all. The LPA could not have intended to include useless wording.
  4. The reason for the condition and the site’s planning history reinforced the findings above by reflecting the council’s intention to maintain close control over the site.

Comment – it depends

Unhelpfully, given Trump, implied meaning will always depend on context. That said, as a result of this judgment:

  • It will be very hard to show that stating that uses are ‘limited to’ a particular use will, alone, be enough to exclude PD rights.
  • Words such as ‘for no other purpose whatsoever’ will likely do the job, but ‘for no other purpose’ alone may hang in the balance.

The difficulty will be for wording that is more emphatic than ‘limited to’ but less emphatic than ‘for no other purposes whatsoever’.

It is not a great outcome for investors, who will have to puzzle over the endless and often pointless variations and contortions in condition wording pumped out by decision makers to understand what price planning freedom. A set of standard conditions embedded in the Planning Practice Guidance which make clear how PD rights should be dealt with and provide a level playing field would be welcome.

With thanks to Ralph Kellas for preparing the blog.

Planning controversies demand clear reasons

A flurry of decisions on reasons have underlined the need for care in explaining planning decisions, from delegated reports to sensitive areas. Our comprehensive guide to the Oakley green belt case and other decisions is here.

The decision in R (Campaign To Protect Rural England, Kent (CPRE)), v Dover District Council [2016] EWCA Civ 936 is on its way to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, it is worth looking into the Court of Appeal’s approach to the standard of reasons required of an authority granting permission for development of a scale “unprecedented in an AONB” in that case. The judgment confirms that reasons for approval may be required in planning matters where basic fairness demands it, despite the absence of a statutory duty, particularly where significant policy breaches are being entertained. It also highlights the benefits of dealing properly with the need for statements of reasons under the EIA regime.

Controversial proposals

The authority’s officers had recommended a less dense, but – according to its advisors – no less viable approach to delivering housing in the sensitive area.  Members rejected that approach on viability grounds and objectors challenged by judicial review on the basis of inadequate reasons.

No reasons required?

The defendant authority started from the position that there is no duty on planning authorities – unlike the Secretary of State – to give detailed reasons for the grant of permission (adopting the ‘light touch’ approach in R (Hawksworth Securities Plc) v Peterborough City Council & Ors [2016] EWHC 1870 (Admin)) where the standards applicable to an inspector’s decision on appeal were distinguished from merely an ‘administrative’ decisions by local planning authorities).

The Court of Appeal recognised that this approach “needs to be treated with some care. Interested parties (and the public) are just as entitled to know why the decision is as it is when it is made by the authority as when it is made by the Secretary of State.”  In the circumstances of Dover, several factors justified detailed reasons:

  • the nature of protective NPPF policies means that decisions to authorising development which will inflict substantial harm on an AONB must be accompanied by “substantial reasons”;
  • a departure from officers’ advice;
  • the applicability of the statutory duty to make a statement of reasons and mitigation under Regulation 24(1)(c) of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011.

Costly admin errors

The Committee minutes in question failed – against that standard – to give legally adequate reasons:

  • firstly, it was unclear whether members accepted their officers’ assessment of harm; if they did, they would have “opted to inflict irreversible harm on the AONB” on the limited material before them;
  • secondly, it was unclear whether they viewed viability issues as a mere risk, which would have made their obligation to address the issue of harm was “all the more acute”;
  • thirdly, it was not clear if they had applied a simple unweighted balance to AONB protections; and
  • finally, they had reached conclusions on visual screening which were “fragile at best and would have to be supported by reasoning a good deal more substantial than the sentence in the minutes”.

EIA goalie?

The judgment helpfully confirms that while the lack of a regulation 24 statement may not necessarily kill a decision where reasons are adequate on the record, it could save it where they are not.

The Supreme Court judgment, when it comes, should provide a definitive position on the basis and scope for reasons for approval. In the meantime, a little transparency and coherence for controversial decisions can only be a sensible approach.

When does a condition restricting use remove PD rights?

Article 3(4) of the GPDO 2015 provides that permitted development (PD) rights will not apply if they are ‘contrary to any condition imposed by any planning permission granted or deemed to be granted under Part 3 of the [TCPA 1990] otherwise than by this Order.’  Must such conditions refer explicitly to the GPDO? If not, what is enough?

Backstory

The Courts have held in some cases that conditions that do not expressly exclude PD rights do not implicitly restrict them (Carpet Décor (Guildford) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another (1981) 261 EG 56 and Dunoon Developments v Secretary of State and Poole Borough Council (1993) 65 P. & C.R. 101). The cases fall short of establishing that conditions cannot, legally, implicitly exclude PD rights:

  • In Carpet Décor, the High Court held that a condition excluding PD rights had to be ‘in unequivocal terms’. This suggests a strict approach, though arguably it does not definitively rule out the possibility of implicit restrictions.
  • In Dunoon, the Court of Appeal made several statements – some strict, some looser.  Indicating the strict approach, Farquharson LJ said: ‘The purpose of the General Development Order is to give a general planning consent unless such a consent is specifically excluded by the words of the condition.’ Indicating the looser approach, Farquharson LJ specifically addressed whether a preclusion of the GDO was ‘…to be implied from the words themselves, in the context in which they are used…’. He went on to consider whether the non-explicit wording of the condition was sufficiently ‘emphatic’, ‘conclusive’ or ‘wide’ to preclude the GDO. Sir Donald Nicholls VC, agreeing with Farquharson LJ , concluded that in this case there was ‘no explicit or implicit intention to negative development pursuant to any existing or future [GDO].’ These passages only make sense if implicit exclusion of PD rights is actually possible.

Who Dunnett?

In the first opportunity to revisit this in 2 decades, the High Court decision in Dunnett Investments Limited v SSCLG [2016] EWHC 534 (Admin) suggests that implicit exclusion of PD rights can work.

  • The claimant relied on PD rights to change from Class B1(a) offices to Class C3 dwelling houses. Its existing permission included a restrictive condition:

“1. This use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained.

REASON: “In order that the Council may be satisfied about the details of proposal due to the particular character and location of this proposal.”

  • The LPA failed to determine the claimant’s PD prior approval application and the claimant applied for a Certificate of Lawfulness (which the LPA refused, based on the condition).
  • The claimant challenged the decision, relying on Carpet Décor and Dunoon as requiring the strict approach (i.e. that the language must be explicit and unequivocal to exclude PD rights).

The Court rejected this, on the basis that:

  1. The second part of the condition serves no other purpose than to prevent the operation of the GPDO. “Without that meaning the second part is irrelevant to the condition”.
  2. The words ‘for no other purpose’ prohibit any other purpose including any other purpose otherwise permitted by the GPDO.
  3. The word ‘whatsoever’ is “emphatic and, in context, refers to any other use, howsoever arising or under any power. Read together, and considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, in my judgment, it is clear that the GPDO is excluded”.
  4. The words “without express planning consent from the local planning authority first being obtained” have no sensible meaning unless they remove GPDO rights.
  5. The reason for the condition confirmed that, due to the particular character and location of the site, any other use would need to be the subject of an express application.

The judgment treats the loose approach as ‘entirely consistent with the cases of Dunoon and Carpet Décor’.

Clear as mud

For the time being, the outcome reflects the prevailing uncertainty for landowners, developers and LPAs, because:

  • it is unclear which elements of the reasons at 1-5 above were decisive,
  • the outcome was said to be fact sensitive.

Dunnett has been appealed to the Court of Appeal and will be heard this month (March 2017). The Court of Appeal could reject the loose approach altogether. If, however, the Court confirms the principle of implicit exclusion of rights, it would be helpful if it clarifies:

  • the forms of wording which will do the job (and those that will not); or
  • whether the effect of the condition entirely depends on the wording read in the context of the reason and the condition as a whole.

In a period where PD rights are increasingly valuable, the outcome will be important.

With thanks to Ralph Kellas for preparing the blog and researching the cases.

Care needed in applying local green belt policies

In R (Lensbury Ltd) v Richmond-Upon-Thames London Borough Council [2016] EWCA Civ 814 the Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court and agreed to quash permission for a hydro-power installation at a weir on Metropolitan Open Land (MOL). The appellant hotel owner succeeded on the grounds that the authority had, in applying its own policies on MOL development, failed to apply the stricter London Plan policies.

London Green Belt

The London Plan gives MOL equivalent status to green belt (applying NPPF policies – i.e. inappropriate development should not be allowed unless there are ‘very special circumstances’ (VSC)). The local plan policies allowed the development to be classified as ‘appropriate development’ in a way that the London Plan policy did not. The authority considered only the local policies.

Failing to refer to the specific (London Plan) policy in the committee report which provided the rationale for the decision was not fatal when considering the extent of compliance with the development as a whole (under Section 38(6) Planning & Compulsory Purchase Act 2004). The analysis did, however, have to make clear that “a particular policy has been brought into account“.

VSC need to be clear

By failing to identify the development as inappropriate in the context of London Plan MOL policy, the authority had failed to ask whether VSC existed which justified the exceptional grant of planning permission. The S.38(6) duty – to determine in accordance with the development plan as a whole, or identify reasons for a different approach – had therefore not been discharged.

The judgment is a reminder that the Courts are pragmatic on the application of S.38(6). The duty does not require a mechanistic treatment of each policy (City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State for Scotland [1977] 1 WLR 1447).  An overall finding of “compliance or conflict” with the development plan as a whole is sufficient, whether express or implicit.

The judgment notes that the dilution of the London Plan approach by the local plan policy appeared to have been overlooked. One oddity of the case is that agreement between the parties that the two policies did not take precedence over each other does not appear to reflect S.38(4), which provides that where there is conflict the most recently adopted policy trumps the older one.

Daylight/ Sunlight Error Fatal To Permission

In Watt, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Hackney & Anor [2016] EWHC 1978 (Admin), the High Court quashed the grant of permission for a mixed use development likely to adversely affect sunlight reaching adjacent open land used by the neighbouring school for children’s play. The application had been considered on the basis the redevelopment of the vacant site would have enhanced the character and appearance of the conservation area.

Latent defects

The authority relied on a daylighting report addressing the extent of reduction in daylight to the play land at different times of year. A claim for judicial review was made on several grounds and independent assessment – carried out after the claim – identified flaws in the original report, exaggerating the existing levels of daylight and so understating (by a third) the effect of the new scheme on the play land.

The judge admitted the new report as part of a ground of claim alleging an error of fact. The defendant authority offered its own evidence in response, but – crucially – did not object to its admission.

Errors of fact can be fatal

The judgment confirms that the error of fact justified quashing the permission in the circumstances: there was a factual error which created a misleading picture; the fact was ‘established’, in the sense of being uncontentious; neither the appellant (nor his advisers) were responsible; and finally, the error played a material part in the reasoning (on the basis that it was impossible to say that had not done so, applying Simplex GE (Holdings) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1989) 57 P&CR 306).

Get your facts right

The daylight reaching the play area was above the relevant policy threshold with the correct analysis (just less far above than the original assessment had, wrongly, suggested). Despite the fact that the error may not have been decisive in the overall decision, though, the judge was prepared to quash the permission.  The judgment therefore confirms the risk that faulty technical work creates for planning decisions, even where the error itself is not decisive.

Court of Appeal Confirms Full OAN Benchmark for Sensitive Area Developments

We commented on Knight Developments saga applying for 100 homes in the Ashdown Forest last year. Although upholding the High Court’s decision to quash the appeal permission, the Court of Appeal has confirmed that authorities resisting applications in National Parks and AONB will need to push the boat out on the duty to co-operate at the Local Plan stage to avoid being caught out on appeal.

Mitigation certainty

The High Court quashed an Inspector’s decision granting permission following errors in relying on recreational mitigation measures to offset traffic-related nitrogen deposition impacts on the Special Protection Area (SPA) and Special Area of Conservation (SAC).  The Court of Appeal agreed – by failing to identify any ‘solid’ S106 mitigation proposals, it was impossible to establish with reasonable certainty that the relevant mitigation, including heathland management, would actually be delivered for the purposes of applying the precautionary principle to assessing SAC/SPA harm.

Exceptional Circumstances

The High Court also rejected the Inspector’s approach to considering Objectively Assessed Needs (OAN) when applying the NPPF116, which states that (emphasis added):

“Planning permission should be refused for major developments in these designated areas except in exceptional circumstances and where it can be demonstrated they are in the public interest. Consideration of such applications should include an assessment of:

  • the need for the development, including in terms of any national considerations, and the impact of permitting it, or refusing it, upon the local economy
  • the cost of, and scope for, developing elsewhere outside the designated area, or meeting the need for it in some other way
  • any detrimental effect on the environment, the landscape and recreational opportunities, and the extent to which that could be moderated.

The Inspector dismissed the alternative sites put forward by the authority not because they were unsuitable, but because ” the existence of other sites, which collectively still fall short of the full OAN, does not amount to an alternative“. He therefore did not use the constrained version which the Core Strategy was designed to meet (taking the SAC/ SPA and other constraints into account).  The High Court judgment appeared to suggest that alternative sites must be considered in detail, regardless of whether they would meet the FOAN.

Clunking Fist of OAN

The Court of Appeal disagreed:

  • There is nothing in the NPPF requiring alternative sites to be looked at across the whole of a local planning authority’s administrative area, or to an area larger or smaller than that. The area of search will be fact specific.  As a matter of fact, the Inspector had looked at both the local and the wider District housing land supply position.
  • Because most of the district was within the AONB, there were few alternative sites suitable for housing development that were “not equally constrained” as the appeal site.  The view that such other available housing sites were unlikely to meet unconstrained OAN was a matter of planning judgment.

Although it upholds the High Court judgment on the SAC/ SPA mitigation point, the Court of Appeal judgment nonetheless expressly endorses the use of FOAN as the benchmark for considering the relevance of alternative sites in National Parks, the Broads and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty. Where up to date Local Plans are adopted to deliver a constrained OAN, these areas are still open to appeals where the level of housing need not being met through the duty to co-operate is less than the up to date FOAN (and the decision-maker is prepared to give meeting needs exceptional weight).

Valued Landscapes Must Be Something Special

In Forest of Dean District Council v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government& Anor [2016] EWHC 2429 (Admin), the local authority failed to quash the grant of permission for 95 homes in the open countryside on appeal. The development was in an undesignated landscape area. The authority claimed it was ‘valued’ nonetheless (so engaging NPPF 109 – requiring a starting point of “protection and enhancement” rather than a planning balance).

Out of the ordinary

Valued landscape is that which is “out of the ordinary”, rather than designated or simply popular (Stroud District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 488 (Admin)). The Inspector decided there were “no particular landscape features, characteristics or elements that demonstrate that the appeal site is in [landscape assessment] terms representative of the wider landscape i.e. a particularly important example which takes this site beyond representing anything more than countryside in general“. However he also concluded that  ‘valued landscape’ must mean a landscape that is considered to be of value because of particular attributes that have been designated through the adoption of a local planning policy document.

The Secretary of State accepted the claimant’s argument, that this was a misapplication of NPPF 109, but resisted quashing of the decision on the basis that the decision would have inevitably been the same. The developer fought back harder, on the basis that the Inspector properly found the landscape not to be valued because it lacked the necessary attributes, and so approached the NPPF 109 policy lawfully.

The claim was dismissed on the basis that while the Inspector’s phrasing was in places “less than optimal”, he had ultimately properly determined the issue having addressed the critical question of whether the landscape had extra-ordinary aspects taking it beyond ‘mere countryside’. The outcome would therefore have been no different.

The status and effect of valued but undesignated landscape is an increasingly common element of objections to greenfield housing schemes. Understanding whether there is any underlying objective basis for local perception of value is crucial to deal properly with these issues.

Planning TV: Tall Buildings, friend or foe?

Dentons Planning TV is a new and innovative platform for engaging in and reacting to the latest developments in the dynamic world of planning. Its mission statement is simple: to provoke debate and facilitate engagement at all levels in the planning process.

In this episode of Planning TV, Gary Rice, Director of Interpolitan Planning Consultants, Scott Adams, Senior Associate at HTA Design joins Roy Pinnock, Dentons, to discuss tall buildings and their role in the city, including typology, the issues surrounding street level and the need to meet growth needs.

Neighbourhood Plans Fudge

The Government’s solution to the so-far intractable problem of Neighbourhood Plans that do not meet housing needs is here in the form of a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) calling time on the  relative certainty provided by the NPPF and firing the starting gun for changes to the NPPF due with the issue of the Housing White Paper early in 2017.  Most Neighbourhood Plans (NPs) will be going nowhere sensible, even more emphatically than ever.

Nothing comes of nothing

The Courts have confirmed that the Examination tests for a Neighbourhood Plan are a cake walk that does not require any sensible relationship with strategic goals of meeting Objectively Assessed Needs. NPs can be passed fit for service at Examination simply having “regard to” national policies where it is “in general conformity with the strategic policies” that may date back to the 1990s and have little or no relationship to the ongoing mess of housing delivery.

Equally, the ability to put NPs in place without any up to date strategic policies – and the endless snakes and ladders of the Local Plan process – creates a challenge for those promoting NPs as a positive framework for local growth.  Adopted NPs may provide a warm glow that immediately fades as an absent overarching housing land supply weighs in under paragraph 49 of the NPPF.

The Government’s response to date has been wholly political.  In some cases NPs have been effectively ignored; in others the out of date NP policies have been given determinative weight, refusing permission for 100 homes at Yapton in an area of housing need with 3 years’ HLS on the basis that out of date NP policies should be given “significant weight”.

Sticking Plaster Applied

laiThe WMS states that

relevant policies for the supply of housing in a neighbourhood plan … should not be deemed to be ‘out-of-date’ [under NPPF49] where […]”:

  • the WMS or the NP are less than 2 years old
  • the NP “allocates sites for housing”
  • the LPA “can demonstrate a three-year supply of deliverable housing sites”.

Cue some authorities currently bobbing around on the Local Plan process to ditch infrastructure planning, batten down the hatches with a 3 year supply and encourage NPs through the process.  Cue some NP that allocate a couple of single unit sites being treated as up to date even if there remains a housing shortfall in the neighbourhood.

A far better solution would simply be to require the NP examination regime to grapple with the unconstrained Objectively Assessed Needs for their area and plan to meet an equitable slice of them until the Local Plan comes along. NP authors are, after all, engaging in devolved governance.  With that great power comes great responsibility.