Planning for an ageing population

The housing shortage and the inability of young people to get onto the property ladder, particularly in the south-east of England, is a near-constant media headline. But what about the needs of older people and the mounting undersupply? Where is the build-to-rent style government support that seeks to incentivise older people’s housing and give the older generation the range and quality of accommodation that they need in retirement?

We look at how planning law and policy are affecting the delivery of homes for older people and whether more can be done to accelerate extra care housing.

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This article was first published in Property Law Journal (May 2019) and is also available at www.lawjournals.co.uk.

Allotments and their protection

The housing shortage and housing affordability, particularly in the South East of England, is a near-constant media headline. Building on its manifesto pledge, in its Autumn 2017 Budget, the government announced its ambition to deliver 300,000 new homes a year by the mid-2020s. We examine the vital role that allotments play in creating communities of the future.

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This article was first published in Property Law Journal (March 2019) and is also available at www.lawjournals.co.uk.

Failing to take account of the up to date local development plan

A recent decision by the Court of Session has quashed a planning appeal refusal determined by the Scottish Ministers for failing to take account of the up to date local development plan.   The case emphasises the importance of monitoring assumptions made as part of the planning process.

An application for planning permission in principle was made for a residential development of 600 units, including affordable housing, commercial space, a public park and a new primary school near Bridge of Allan.

When the application was submitted, Stirling’s Local Development Plan (“LDP”) did not allocate sufficient land for housing  to provide a 5 year supply.  As such, the relevant LDP housing policies would be considered out of date and Scottish Planning Policy (“SPP”) would apply. The SPP provides a presumption in favour of development which contributes to sustainable development as a significant material consideration.

However, the development was proposed on land lying within the North Stirling Green Belt and the LDP contained policies protecting the green belt from development.

The planning officer recommended the application for approval due to the benefit of the development outweighing the effect on the green belt; the SPP favouring sustainable development; the significant weight to be attached to the SPP which outweighed the policies of the LDP; and the impact of the development being mitigated by a proposed Section 75 Agreement and the imposition of planning conditions.

However, the application was refused on 23 March 2016.  The Council determined that the benefits of the development would not outweigh non-compliance with the LDP and the proposed mitigation of the impact of the development on the greenbelt, flooding and transport would not be sufficient.

An appeal was submitted and was called in by the Scottish Ministers and a Reporter was instructed to examine and report on the appeal. During the appeal process, a new LDP was being progressed which sought to provide a sufficient 5 year land supply for housing.  In his report to the Scottish Ministers, the Reporter made certain assumptions about the incoming LDP and stated that:

On the assumption that the proposed replacement development plan should identify sufficient sites, the land supply shortage may be resolved before development commences on site; … and … There is also an expectation that the proposed replacement LDP, currently under examination, will properly address the shortfall before any housing is built on this site if the appeal is allowed.

The Reporter estimated that the number of units which could realistically be provided by the proposed development within the 5 year land supply period would be 175 which was some way short of addressing the 896 unit shortfall.

The Reporter concluded that the development would only address the housing land shortfall in part; the harm to the green belt must be given considerable weight; that this would not be outweighed by the SPP presumption in favour of sustainable development; and to approve the development would be prejudicial to the emerging LDP which would set out the location of sufficient housing land for a 5 year supply.  As such, the Reporter recommended refusal of the appeal.

However, when the LDP was approved for adoption on 3 May 2018 the new LDP still did not provide a sufficient housing land  supply with a shortfall of 169 units. Despite this being brought to the attention of the Scottish Ministers in a report prepared by its officials on 17 May 2018, the Scottish Ministers issued their decision on 18 June 2018 refusing the appeal, stating that they accepted the Reporter’s recommendations and conclusions and adopted them for the purpose of their own decision. 

By doing so, the Scottish Ministers adopted a decision which was based, in part, on a material consideration regarding the emerging LDP to provide sufficient housing land supply which had later proved to be incorrect. 

The applicant appealed the Scottish Ministers’ decision to the Court of Session and Lord Carloway, delivering the opinion of the Court, determined that it was incumbent on the Scottish Ministers, as the decision maker, to take into account all relevant material considerations.  In this instance, the Scottish Ministers in adopting the Reporter’s recommendation, had (1) taken into account a material consideration which had become irrelevant; and (2) failed to take into account a material consideration that the approved emerging LDP did not provide a sufficient housing land supply.  Therefore, the decision to refuse the appeal was quashed. The Court of Session can only review the legal validity of the appeal decision and cannot substitute its own decision.  It therefore falls upon the Scottish Ministers to reconsider the appeal.  They will have to be more careful next time.

Viability – Speed of Delivery Matters

Last year, the High Court in R (McCarthy and Stone Retirement Lifestyles Ltd) v Greater London Authority [2018] EWHC 1202 (Admin) found the Mayor of London’s 2017 Affordable Housing and Viability SPG unlawful in one respect: the SPG sought to require all planning applications that do not provide at least 35% affordable housing to be subject to early and late stage viability reviews (the ‘Viability Tested Route’). 

This, the Court found, is inconsistent with current London Plan Policy 3.12 which only requires further reviews on developments that are ‘likely to take many years to implement‘.  It was therefore not something that the SPG could, as guidance, properly cover.

So what?

Policy H6 of the Draft New London Plan now seeks to convert the SPG’s approach to viability into policy.  The Mayor has therefore been unruffled by the judgment. Although the Draft London Plan is not yet adopted, he has given full weight to the emerging policy. 

The McCarthy and Stone judgment was more circumspect about weight (paragraph 57), noting that only once representations had been considered and the DNLP amended would it have equal weight to guidance.  It would, it was held, be normal at that point for it to have “some” weight. 

London Plan Weightlessness

The Millharbour appeal decision in December bears out the limited weight that the draft policies deserve. The Inspector found that a late stage review was not necessary to make a proposal, offering 16% affordable housing, acceptable in planning terms.

This was a single-phase, mixed-use scheme including two tall buildings and 319 residential units in Tower Hamlets.

The Council agreed with the developer that only 16% affordable housing could be provided, but nonetheless sought to justify a late stage review on two grounds:

  • first, the appellant’s earlier viability assessments suggested 35% and 40% affordable housing could be provided;
  • second, the Draft London Plan applies the Viability Tested Route where the relevant affordable housing threshold is not met.

Rejecting that, the Inspector had ‘no reason to quibble with the [agreed] 16% level‘ and found that:

  • the previous affordable housing offers carried no weight in justifying a late stage review. The Draft London Plan carried only ‘limited weight’;
  •  a late stage review would only be needed (citing McCarthy and Stone) where a scheme ‘took ‘many years’ to implement or build out‘. It was ‘very unlikely this scheme would be left unfinished for any length of time or that it would take many years to complete’. Hence, no late stage review was required.

This appeal decision shows that decision-takers may, at least in the short term, find it harder to rely on policy alone to justify further viability reviews for schemes offering sub-threshold levels of affordable housing. Where policy is being relied on, it is likely to focus minds on the ‘likely to take years to implement’ criterion, imprecise and evidentially problematic though it is.

The decision also suggests that a) speedy delivery (i.e. of smaller, more straightforward schemes) as a matter of policy has the potential to compromise affordable housing, and b) conversely, slower and longer/phased schemes may be subject to higher affordable housing requirements. The Mayor will be concerned that this does not create perverse incentives. In any event, all sides will be keenly watching the examination of Draft Policy H6.

Consenting New Towns

Development Consent Orders are a great way to draw together the consents necessary for a piece of infrastructure.   As the locally led garden towns movement grows there are siren calls to use the DCO process to help deliver some of the housing that is needed. Could a DCO could be used for a new town or major urban extension?

Building a windfarm and creating a community are very different. Any new town worth its salt will evolve over time – both during initial development and beyond. Having the ability to evolve is crucial.  What we imagine now as the community of the future is, almost inevitably, wrong. People will live differently. They will travel differently.  Education will be delivered differently. Health and well-being will be part of daily life, to prevent the cost of medicine and elderly care becoming a national millstone.  Shopping will have undergone several revolutions. The nature of jobs, and the balance between jobs, homes and social life will probably be unrecognisable. New communities will also need be actively curated. Success will depend as much on the relationships that are created as upon the bricks and mortar. The built form of all communities will have to change, and adapt over time, to reflect these processes.

The present breed of DCOs is probably ill-suited to this type of long-term social engineering. At the moment they suffer from inflexibility.  They work well where the proposal is clear, neat, tidy and fixed – like a windfarm.  New towns are not so neat and tidy.  DCOs to date have also largely been governance free exercises – aside from a few controls on “reserved matters” and security for CPO compensation.  Delivering new towns will need the active participation of the public and private sector, as well as both existing and future communities. It will need both active and passive governance. None of this has been addressed, so far, in the DCO process.

One of the hardest lessons for those delivering new towns is that they are, and should be changeable, iterative, complicated, exercises in trial and error, buffeted by markets, politics and people. There will be many different ways to deliver them, from private sector schemes going through the traditional planning process with negotiated long term quality partnerships through to development corporations, both nationally and locally led. And there will be numerous variants in between.  A common factor to all will be the need to facilitate and encourage change.   We need to ensure that the benefits of variety and the capacity to evolve is not straitjacketed by the using DCOs if they remain as rigid as they are at present.  Remember that the sirens called ships to ruin on their rocks.

Need for up to date local development plans

We consider a recent appeal decision for 601 houses at Overtown which confirms that unless Local Authorities keep local development plans up to date and demonstrate effective housing supply they will lose planning appeals, even on green belt land.

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Powers and partnership for regeneration

The case of Peters v London Borough of Haringey (Haringey) provides welcome clarity over the extent of the local authorities powers to form limited liability partnerships (LLPs) for the delivery of regeneration projects carried out in partnership with the private sector.

Partnership approach

LLPs offer benefits:

  • tax transparency (particularly for the private sector participant) in relation to corporation tax and VAT;
  • governance (often a key concern for the public sector): the fact that LLP members don’t generally owe a fiduciary duty to the LLP can alleviate concerns over conflicts and other issues.

Haringey Development Vehicle

The case concerned the high profile procurement, by Haringey, of a joint venture partner to participate in the Haringey Development Vehicle (HDV).  The HDV was to have responsibility for the delivery of specific projects as well as the general management and exploitation of Haringey estate.   The various reports identified some key benefits from participating in the project including: (a) an estimated 6,400 new homes; (b) development returns of £275m, plus S106 and CIL payments; (c) £8m HDV investment into a social and economic programme and £20m Lendlease investment in a Social Impact Vehicle.  The HDV was formed as a LLP, with 50/50 control between Haringey and Lendlease.

Opposition

However, the HDV project faced fierce political opposition, one manifestation of which was the challenge by a former senior local government official in Haringey in relation to the lawfulness of the project on a number of grounds, including (the exclusive focus of this blog) the use of an LLP as the legal entity to deliver the project.

Haringey had relied upon Section 1 of the Localism Act 2011, which provides a general power of competence to “do anything that individuals generally may do“.  Section 1 of the Act is however qualified by Section 4(2), which states that “where, in exercise of the general power, a local authority does things for a commercial purpose, the authority must do them through a company“, with “company” being defined specifically as a company under the Companies Act 2006 (and not a partnership).

The Claimant was therefore arguing that, by using a LLP as opposed to a limited company, Haringey was acting unlawfully – but this was dependent on whether Haringey was undertaking the HDV project “for a commercial purpose”.

Commercial purposes?

In determining whether there was a commercial purpose the judge, Ouseley J, held that Section 4(2) of the Act is not intended to narrow the scope of pre-existing powers.  He also made clear that Lendlease’s purposes (which were clearly profit driven) were not relevant to the analysis; neither were those of the LLP itself – what was important was Haringey’s purposes.

And on that question Ouseley J was clear that the purposes were not commercial, and the challenge therefore failed.  The objective of the HDV project was for the achievement of “housing, employment and growth or regeneration objectives”.  He said “achieving a return is neither purpose or the activity of itself”.  The fact that profit may be a consequence of achieving best consideration on land disposals and of acting prudently did not mean that the Council was acting for a commercial purpose.  To the extent it was doing so, it could be said to be doing so in order to further its primary non-commercial purposes.

Relevance

For local authorities and developers alike the case provides helpful clarity on the lawfulness of using LLPs to deliver regeneration projects.  Although each case will need to be considered on its facts (including some analysis of the intentions of the authority), the case provides a very helpful sign-post toward what local government powers allow for.

Post script…

While the challenge failed at law, but the future for the HDV project itself is uncertain.

Following the judgment, the Labour leader who had originally promoted the HDV scheme was replaced and the Labour party (under new leadership) fought the May 2018 elections on a platform which included scrapping the HDV – illustrating that very often at local government level political support for a project can be as important as being legally “correct”.

The case illustrates that a claim can “succeed” in the broader sense of creating a pause in which political opposition may overcome a unpopular (but lawful) decision.  That should influence the circumstances in which delivery vehicles are deemed to be the appropriate mechanism for regeneration – sometimes a lower risk strategy will be to opt for an easier to understand and less legally contentious approach will be the right option.

As of July 2018, the precise status of the HDV is unclear, but the “Stop HDV” group continues to campaign against any kind of reanimation of the scheme.

Post post script

On 17 July 2018, Haringey Council finally decided to scrap the HDV project. 

Their stated reason was that the risk level had increased in the period since it initially entered the deal (a decision taken under the Council’s previous Labour leadership), although the political pressure to act was no doubt a significant contributory factor. The risks highlighted (and used to justify the decision) include those related to committing its commercial portfolio to the HDV, as well as the satisfaction of conditions and land for development.

According to press reports, Haringey Council have been threatened by Lendlease with a multimillion pound lawsuit for the loss of profit from the project. It has also been revealed that the Council is obligated to pay £500,000 to cover the costs of Lendlease relating to HDV. The Council also faces cost of around £2.5m spent on setting up the HDV.

Capital Gains

Dentons, together with URBED and Gerald Eve, were instructed by the Greater London Authority to look at international land assembly practices, to feed into recommendations on those conditions that would best support land assembly for house-building in London.  On 14 May the Deputy Mayor, James Murray, published ‘Capital Gains: A Better Land Assembly Model for London’ which brings together the research evidence and sets out 10 recommendations to support a shift in land assembly practice.

In London, the assembly of land is often seen as one of the main challenges to increasing build-out rates. The report identifies several barriers to land assembly in London, ranging from factors inherent in the sites, such as contamination, to factors associated with ownership, such as the extent of fragmentation and compensation expectations. The research evidence focussed on three European case studies – ZAC Claude Bernard in Paris, Freiburg in Germany and Amersfoort in The Netherlands – and a North American case study focussing on Toronto, Canada and Oregon, USA. The research identified policies, strategies and procedures that have been applied positively to facilitate land assembly and accelerate the pace of delivery. Those measures that we consider are the ‘best fit’ for London form the basis of the 10 recommendations.

A core recommendation is the introduction of a new planning designation termed ‘Land Assembly Zones’ (recommendation 1). These are strategic sites or areas where land assembly will be supported, through interventionist measures if required. The aim is to provide a focus and to encourage land owners to self-assemble, with a designation as a LAZ being accompanied by an ‘in principle’ resolution to exercise compulsory acquisition powers (recommendation 2). This would be a clear signal to landowners, and also an invitation to developers to bring forward proposals in the area.  The measures recognise that limited resources are available for public intervention and we expect the zones will be focused on those areas where housing density can be significantly increased if land is assembled into larger development parcels, where fragmented ownership is a real development constraint and, initially at least, in areas with good transport connections.  We recommend that land values are frozen for CPO compensation purposes on the date of designation, to crystallise the ‘hope element’ of the CPO compensation (recommendation 8).

The second core recommendation is the introduction of statutory land pooling. We recommend that the GLA prepare template documents to support the voluntary bringing together of land, drawing on the Dutch Building Rights model of sharing value uplift. In the longer term we recommend that this voluntary approach be underpinned by a new statutory mechanism (recommendation 7). We see that mechanism covering two scenarios: a private sector model, driven by landowners and a public-sector model led by the GLA or local authority.  In both scenarios the compensation paid to landowners would include part of the marriage value of the assembled site. Although not a formal recommendation in the body of the report we explore the possibility of “density bonuses” where land is masterplanned and assembled, potentially also delivering additional value and an incentive to self assemble.  We see this type of land pooling having application on all scales of site. We suggest the creation of a multi-disciplinary team to support boroughs and developers in tackling strategic and difficult sites, with the devolution of additional finance to support this (recommendation 10).

The report makes further recommendations regarding the acquisition of land, including allowing the confirmation of CPOs in the interests of ‘good planning’ ahead of planning consent being granted. Developers of large strategic sites need certainty at the start of a project that the entirety of the land will be available, even though it may not be built out for several years. Against that backdrop it is unrealistic to expect there to be a fully worked up scheme. We suggest that weight be given to the LAZ designation (which itself will be the subject of scrutiny) when considering whether the confirmation of the CPO is in the public interest (recommendation 4). In order to facilitate this we believe the power to confirm borough CPOs should be delegated to the GLA (recommendation 5).  This would assist in embedding ‘innovative’ approaches to the exercise of CPO powers. For example the introduction of a ‘use it or lose it’ approach to CPO land. If development on land which has been acquired compulsorily does not proceed the GLA or local authority should step in to hold that land, and any other land owned by the proposed developer, to ensure it is brought forward for development.

Mind the Gap – Letwin Review should take care to avoid policy overload

The Letwin Review is considering why there is a significant gap between the number of planning permissions being granted and the number of homes built.

Initial findings are due to be published with the Chancellor’s Spring Statement 2018 in March (with the final report in the Autumn Budget).  There are a few things to think about before engaging in another orgy of Plan-Shaming and policy overload.

Apples and Pears

There is a need to be careful about how sites are looked at in the first phase of the Review:

  • Treating outline consents as if they are, or should be, immediately implementable is wrong. Outline consents can require significant work to reach detailed approval, let alone readiness for mobilisation and delivery.
  • Care is needed too, on what is treated as ‘delivery’.  Site mobilisation (for example enabling infrastructure) takes time and pre-dates construction of homes.

Defining what delivery and success look like is therefore important to avoid categorising sites that are being invested in – but have not yet yielded homes – as dormant. This will be significant in the context of the emerging Housing Delivery Test, which should be a fundamental part of the Local Plan system.

90% of percentages are wrong…

Various figures are bandied around on how many consents are ‘unimplemented’. Even adopting the higher level figure of 423,000 unimplemented homes with consent:

  • that is a tiny proportion of total supply – roughly 12-14 months of planning approvals
  • it illustrates the need for a deeper stock of permissions to achieve the heroic build out rates the Government is now committed to.

A Local Plan system which made more (and more detailed) site allocations, with clarity about infrastructure requirements, would make a big contribution to closing the gap between in principle approval for development and the detail needed for delivery. Likewise, a Local Plan system that sniffed and snuffed out unrealistic assumptions on delivery rates when trajectories are being examined would help ensure the right number of consents are granted in the first place to create the stock needed.

Diversification

Businesses will generally develop at the rate they are best able to achieve and which reflects the overarching price/demand relationship.  Rather than blaming the private sector for the speed it can – prudently –  build at, it would be more productive to look at how to achieve an increase in direct delivery (or directed delivery) by public bodies which have historically made up at least 100,000 of the gap to the Government’s 300,000 homes per year commitment.

In some cases that will involve more assertive use of land assembly and policy tools in a way that creates greater certainty about land values up front so that builders can build and sell more quickly.

Planning blame-fest?

Evidence from the sector on the non-Planning constraints to delivery is important.  Is there a skills gap, what will Brexit do to it and if Government is sponsoring Brexit how will it sponsor the solution?

From the frontline, a few of the  Planning matters that do slow things down are:

  • Length of time taken to deal with highways works agreements. The absence of a standard template agreement is a real blight on the development process.
    Constant reinvention of the wheel and imposition of poorly drafted and unreasonable requirements does have a real impact on the site mobilisation process. Government could sponsor a standard form and issue guidance recommending its use.
  • The bloat and general time-soak associated with unnecessary use of planning obligations. Our ‘speeding tickets’ blog flagged ways to speed things up without scarce Parliamentary time being needed.

Deliverability vs Delivery – Court of Appeal confirms NPPF approach

The Court of Appeal has clarified the meaning of ‘deliverable sites’ in the key housing land supply provisions of Paragraph 47 NPPF (5YHLS).  As well as emphasising the need for pragmatism when applying the NPPF, the judgment confirms the need to get timing right if challenges are to be made to the assumed rate of housing delivery.

Supply test in question

In St Modwen v SoS CLG, the developer challenged the housing trajectory put forward by the authority to satisfy the NPPF 47 requirement to show specific deliverable sites sufficient to provide five years worth of housing against objectively assessed need. NPPF Footnote 11 confirms that ‘deliverable’ means available now, offer[ing] a suitable location for development now, and […] achievable with a realistic prospect that housing will be delivered on the site within five years and […] viable.

The Inspector disagreed that sites without permission should be excluded.  She accepted that the rate of consents was likely to increase in light of the draft plan.  She acknowledged a distinction between deliverability and likelihood of delivery: ‘…it may well turn out that not all allocations currently identified as deliverable will in fact be delivered’. The submitted HLS figures were robust, because ‘the assessment of supply is distinct from that for delivery’.

The Secretary of State accepted the Inspector’s finding that there was a 5 year HLS and dismissed the two linked appeals.

Courts insist on common sense

The High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the argument raised in seeking judicial review of the decision that the SoS had misunderstood and misapplied the concept of ‘deliverability’.  He should, it was claimed, have considered what would ‘probably be delivered’.

The Court of Appeal disagreed that Ouseley J’s judgment in the High Court suggested that assessment of ‘what probably would be delivered’ is part of, not separate from, the assessment of deliverability.

Ouseley’s judgment – that the assessment of “deliverability” … is an assessment of the likelihood that housing will be delivered. [It] does not require certainty that the housing sites will actually be delivered’ (emphasis added) – simply reflected the distinction between the HLS figure required under the first part of NPPF47 and the ‘expected rate of delivery’ required for the trajectory under the second part.

The Court of Appeal once again went out of its way to criticise ‘unreal’ arguments on the meaning of NPPF policy, holding that:

  • there is a consistent and intentional distinction in the NPPF between ‘deliverability’ and the ‘expected rate of delivery’;
  • deliverability in footnote 11 concern sites’ capability of being delivered – not the certainty/ probability of delivery;
  • the appeal decision was being taken in light of NPPF49, engaging the question of demonstrable 5YHLS, not a question about the ‘the expected rate of housing delivery’.

So what?

The judgment serves to emphasise that:

  • there need only be a ‘realistic prospect’ of delivery for sites to be relied in within the 5YHLS;
  • challenges to the assumptions around the expected rate of delivery generally need to be taken up at the Local Plan examination stage;
  • Local planning authorities do not control the housing market. The NPPF recognises that.’

The last point underlines the fact that LPAs play a critical role, but are only one part of the housing delivery jigsaw. It is also illustrates how important the Housing Delivery Test will be, as a sense check on assumptions and progress, if it is introduced as promised in the Housing White Paper.