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Update: When does a condition restricting use remove PD rights?

Last month we blogged on the High Court’s judgment in Dunnett, which refused to quash the Secretary of State decision not to grant a Certificate of Lawfulness in respect of the use of office to residential Permitted Development rights where a condition on the office consent was effective in excluding GPDO rights. The condition stated that “The use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained.”

The Court of Appeal has now upheld the High Court’s judgment.

The result? Uncertainty prevails.

Trump reigns

The Court of Appeal noted that there is no bar to (cautiously) implying terms into planning conditions: doing so is an objective, fact-dependent exercise in which the Court asks ‘what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole’ (applying Trump International ([2015] UKSC 74).

Deconstructing the condition

Against that backdrop, the Court of Appeal held:

  1. The words ‘and for no other purpose whatsoever’ were, in this case, enough not only to control the B use of the property, but also to exclude future reliance on PD rights. The wording that followed – ‘without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained’ (the “Tail”) – just made the exclusion ‘the more abundantly clear’.
  2. The Tail cannot sensibly include a planning permission granted through the GPDO. The appellant argued that it was necessary to read into the Tail ‘or the Secretary of State’ because of the unavoidable possibility of the Secretary of State granting planning permission on appeal against a refusal by the LPA. Once that is read in, the Appellant submitted, it must include Secretary of State decisions through the GPDO as well as Secretary of State decisions on appeal as there is no basis for including one but not the other. The Court rejected this: it is not necessary to imply ‘or the Secretary of State’ at all because appeal rights do not depend on conditions; they are conferred automatically by statute.
  3. Further, if the Court were to accept the appellant’s argument, the Tail would include all means of granting permission and would therefore have no limiting effect at all. The LPA could not have intended to include useless wording.
  4. The reason for the condition and the site’s planning history reinforced the findings above by reflecting the council’s intention to maintain close control over the site.

Comment – it depends

Unhelpfully, given Trump, implied meaning will always depend on context. That said, as a result of this judgment:

  • It will be very hard to show that stating that uses are ‘limited to’ a particular use will, alone, be enough to exclude PD rights.
  • Words such as ‘for no other purpose whatsoever’ will likely do the job, but ‘for no other purpose’ alone may hang in the balance.

The difficulty will be for wording that is more emphatic than ‘limited to’ but less emphatic than ‘for no other purposes whatsoever’.

It is not a great outcome for investors, who will have to puzzle over the endless and often pointless variations and contortions in condition wording pumped out by decision makers to understand what price planning freedom. A set of standard conditions embedded in the Planning Practice Guidance which make clear how PD rights should be dealt with and provide a level playing field would be welcome.

With thanks to Ralph Kellas for preparing the blog.

When does a condition restricting use remove PD rights?

Article 3(4) of the GPDO 2015 provides that permitted development (PD) rights will not apply if they are ‘contrary to any condition imposed by any planning permission granted or deemed to be granted under Part 3 of the [TCPA 1990] otherwise than by this Order.’  Must such conditions refer explicitly to the GPDO? If not, what is enough?

Backstory

The Courts have held in some cases that conditions that do not expressly exclude PD rights do not implicitly restrict them (Carpet Décor (Guildford) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another (1981) 261 EG 56 and Dunoon Developments v Secretary of State and Poole Borough Council (1993) 65 P. & C.R. 101). The cases fall short of establishing that conditions cannot, legally, implicitly exclude PD rights:

  • In Carpet Décor, the High Court held that a condition excluding PD rights had to be ‘in unequivocal terms’. This suggests a strict approach, though arguably it does not definitively rule out the possibility of implicit restrictions.
  • In Dunoon, the Court of Appeal made several statements – some strict, some looser.  Indicating the strict approach, Farquharson LJ said: ‘The purpose of the General Development Order is to give a general planning consent unless such a consent is specifically excluded by the words of the condition.’ Indicating the looser approach, Farquharson LJ specifically addressed whether a preclusion of the GDO was ‘…to be implied from the words themselves, in the context in which they are used…’. He went on to consider whether the non-explicit wording of the condition was sufficiently ‘emphatic’, ‘conclusive’ or ‘wide’ to preclude the GDO. Sir Donald Nicholls VC, agreeing with Farquharson LJ , concluded that in this case there was ‘no explicit or implicit intention to negative development pursuant to any existing or future [GDO].’ These passages only make sense if implicit exclusion of PD rights is actually possible.

Who Dunnett?

In the first opportunity to revisit this in 2 decades, the High Court decision in Dunnett Investments Limited v SSCLG [2016] EWHC 534 (Admin) suggests that implicit exclusion of PD rights can work.

  • The claimant relied on PD rights to change from Class B1(a) offices to Class C3 dwelling houses. Its existing permission included a restrictive condition:

“1. This use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained.

REASON: “In order that the Council may be satisfied about the details of proposal due to the particular character and location of this proposal.”

  • The LPA failed to determine the claimant’s PD prior approval application and the claimant applied for a Certificate of Lawfulness (which the LPA refused, based on the condition).
  • The claimant challenged the decision, relying on Carpet Décor and Dunoon as requiring the strict approach (i.e. that the language must be explicit and unequivocal to exclude PD rights).

The Court rejected this, on the basis that:

  1. The second part of the condition serves no other purpose than to prevent the operation of the GPDO. “Without that meaning the second part is irrelevant to the condition”.
  2. The words ‘for no other purpose’ prohibit any other purpose including any other purpose otherwise permitted by the GPDO.
  3. The word ‘whatsoever’ is “emphatic and, in context, refers to any other use, howsoever arising or under any power. Read together, and considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, in my judgment, it is clear that the GPDO is excluded”.
  4. The words “without express planning consent from the local planning authority first being obtained” have no sensible meaning unless they remove GPDO rights.
  5. The reason for the condition confirmed that, due to the particular character and location of the site, any other use would need to be the subject of an express application.

The judgment treats the loose approach as ‘entirely consistent with the cases of Dunoon and Carpet Décor’.

Clear as mud

For the time being, the outcome reflects the prevailing uncertainty for landowners, developers and LPAs, because:

  • it is unclear which elements of the reasons at 1-5 above were decisive,
  • the outcome was said to be fact sensitive.

Dunnett has been appealed to the Court of Appeal and will be heard this month (March 2017). The Court of Appeal could reject the loose approach altogether. If, however, the Court confirms the principle of implicit exclusion of rights, it would be helpful if it clarifies:

  • the forms of wording which will do the job (and those that will not); or
  • whether the effect of the condition entirely depends on the wording read in the context of the reason and the condition as a whole.

In a period where PD rights are increasingly valuable, the outcome will be important.

With thanks to Ralph Kellas for preparing the blog and researching the cases.

The need for focus on conditions (and not descriptions) in Section 73 applications

The consequences of failing to restrict use by imposing a condition were highlighted in a recent appeal decision concerning a DIY retail unit in South West London.

Both the original planning permission for the retail unit and a subsequent section 73 permission (granted in 2010) included a condition to restrict the sale of non-food goods.  However, the final section 73 permission granted in 2014 contained no such condition.

In 2015, the appellant sought a lawful development certificate permitting use of the premises for purposes within Use Class A1 without restriction on the goods that could be sold. Notwithstanding the lack of a condition restricting use, the Council refused.  Consequently, the applicant appealed citing the decision in I’m your Man v Secretary of State [1999] 77 P. & C.R. 251, which held that where a limitation is to be imposed on a permission granted pursuant to an application, it must be done by condition.

The Council contended that the original conditions were incorporated by reference to the previous permissions or should be implied, referring to the Reid case which held that it is permissible to impose conditions by reference to an earlier planning permission.

However, the Inspector rejected the Council’s arguments, finding that the principles from Reid could not reasonably be extended to the creation and incorporation of an entirely new condition which does not appear on the 2014 permission other than in the description, in accordance with the decision in Dunnett Investments.  The Inspector held that no condition restricting the nature of the retail use to specific uses falling within Use Class A1 had therefore been imposed on the final planning permission.  Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the lawful development certificate issued.

So what can we take away from the case?

  1. The importance of conditions controlling use.

The decision in Reid confirmed that, in the case of planning permissions granted under section 73, conditions can be imposed in various ways:

  1. impose fresh conditions mirroring the original conditions save for the variation; or
  2. impose only the varied condition and incorporate the unaffected conditions by cross-reference to the original permission.

However, whichever method is used, any differing conditions must be incorporated in full in the new permission. For certainty, LPAs must adopt a ‘belts and braces’ approach and set out all the conditions to which the new planning permission will be subject, restating any unchanged conditions in full rather than relying on cross-referencing.

  1. The myth that the description of development can be varied by way of a section 73 application persists.

Confusion often arises as a result of overly complex and unclear descriptions of development, which applicants and local authorities seek to amend to accord more closely with the section 73 proposals. However, there is no formal ability under section 73 to amend the description of development.  It is therefore better to avoid references to the use classes, floor areas and number of units in the description of development (where possible), as it invariably acts to constrain the ability to lawfully use section 73 amendments to amend schemes post approval.

Steering clear of amendments to the description of development can help to maintain the focus on varying the relevant conditions, reducing the potential for LPAs to fall foul of this issue. As is clear from the present case, LPAs cannot rely on undefined conditions being imposed or implied into new permissions granted under section 73.

As a final note, we are willing to bet that I’m Your Man will be overturned at some point by the Courts or will be ousted by legislation. A failure to constrain by condition something that was clearly described as limited in the description of development should not, as a matter of fairness, lead to a windfall for the owner and a cost to the community.

Amalgamation of units still at risk

As we have noted previously, the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“TCPA”) is clear that the conversion of a single unit into several units requires planning permission. Although the legislation is silent on amalgamation, it may too be a material change of use requiring planning permission (see our 13 May 2014 blog).

In the recent Cheyne Gardens appeal an Inspector dismissed an appeal against Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (“RBKC”)’s decision not to grant a certificate of lawfulness for works to amalgamate two flats into a single dwelling. Planning permission had been refused and the applicant argued that a Certificate should be granted on the grounds that there was no material change of use requiring planning permission.  The analysis centred on two questions:

1          Is the change of use ‘development’?  ap

The appellant argued that the proposals should not be treated as development on the basis of Section 55(2)(f) TCPA and Article 3(1) of The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987. Both provide that where a building is used for a purpose of any class specified in the schedule to that Order, the use of that building for any other purpose within the same class shall not be taken to involve development of land. In Richmond upon Thames v SSETR & Richmond upon Thames Churches Housing Trust [2000] this was confirmed as engaged where the combined units were already in a single occupation.

The Inspector refused to apply Section 55(2)(f) and Article 3(1) on the basis that the two flats in this case were in use as two separate dwellinghouses, each occupied by a single household or person. The revised position would be one unit occupied by a single household or person.  Whilst the new arrangement, by virtue of the amalgamation, would be used for one of the uses within Class C3, it would not be the self-same building in the before and after scenarios.  The amalgamation was therefore development capable of amounting to a material change of use.

2          Is the change of use material in planning terms?

Richmond established that the extent to which a particular use fulfils a legitimate or recognised planning purpose (in terms of a purpose relating to the character of the land) is relevant in deciding whether a change from that use is a material change of use.   In particular, the loss of a particular type of residential accommodation where that loss was resisted by specific policies.

RBKC put forward evidence that de-conversions and amalgamations were anticipated to result in the loss of 400 homes over a five year period. Set against that, London Plan Policy 3.3 imposes a minimum 10 year housing building target of 7,330 dwellings for RBKC, with an annual monitoring target of 733 homes.  The Inspector considered that the loss of one unit should be considered against the annual target.  Despite accepting that this would be an “almost infinitesimal change” (and the loss of the single unit was under the 5 unit threshold set in the RBKC policy) he nonetheless decided that it would “as a matter of fact and degree have a significant impact in planning terms” concluding that circumstances had “changed significantly” since the adoption of that policy.

So what?

The focus of recent amalgamation appeals has been on the materiality of the change, rather than the question of whether there has been a change of use. The decision reflects the approach applied by the High Court in June, quashing CLEUD and Section 78 appeals on the basis that the Inspector should have taken account of generalised housing need arguments despite the lack of a specific policy threshold.

Although there is real scope to achieve permission on the basis that the loss of supply is clearly de minimis, the Cheyne Gardens decision confirms that decision makers will continue to treat general housing supply policies as a basis for regarding small amalgamations as material even though more specific policies on such changes do not necessarily warrant it.  The difficulties of doing so in the absence of such policies are illustrated by the 77 Drayton Gardens decision, in which the Inspector refused to grant a CLEUD (on the basis that a material change had occurred by virtue of amalgamation of two units, treating the existence of restrictive policies as weighing on the ‘threshold’ question of whether a change of use had occurred). He nonetheless quashed the related enforcement notice and granted permission on the basis that evidence of housing need (including for larger units) and actual supply outweighed the conflict with the development plan.

Vacant Building Credit – an own goal?

Vacant Building Credit (VBC) was re-introduced into the NPPG in May 2016 to less vocal opposition than it faced when originally introduced following a Ministerial Statement in November 2014.  The Statement remains intact following the Court of Appeal’s ruling that it should stand.

The broad premise of  VBC is that is acts as a credit which can be offset against the affordable housing requirement of new development.  The credit is equivalent to the existing gross floorspace of a vacant building brought back into use or demolished for redevelopment purposes.  However, neither ‘abandoned’ buildings or those vacated for the sole purpose of redevelopment are able to benefit from VBC.

Unhelpfully, the NPPG gives no guidance on how VBC is intended to be applied.  Two immediate issues arise:

  • buildWhat is meant by “vacant”?  There is a concern that VBC will incentivise landlords to force the vacation of offices, industrial buildings or even houses to benefit from VBC.  There is also little assistance on where the line can be drawn to assess whether a building is “vacant” or “abandoned”.
  • What is meant by the “gross floorspace” of the vacant building – GIA over GEA?  Once that has been confirmed, how that floorspace should be applied to calculate the off-set?

As a consequence, local authorities are left to make sense of how to apply VBC, and inevitably are creating methods and policies for approaching VBC in a way which will minimise its impact on affordable housing delivery.  Emerging practice includes:

(i)         interpreting “vacant” as being opposite to the “in use” building test set out in the CIL Regulations.  This ensures that a development is unable to benefit from both VBC and the demolition credit which can reduce the amount of CIL payable;

(ii)         requiring the entire building to be vacant, not just part of it;

(iii)        requiring the building for which VBC has been sought to have been actively marketed for a specified period (and for the method and details of marketing to be provided);

(iv)        requiring details of existing floorspace to be provided on a GIA basis when a planning application is submitted.

Of those local authorities that are putting in place policies for calculating VBC, it is clear that there is no standard approach; others will be reviewing whether they apply VBC at all.  The West Berkshire appeal confirmed that the VBC policy is a material consideration and is not capable of being applied in a “blanket” manner; many local authorities will be taking comfort from this, possibly even reviewing how Local Plan policies can be formulated to disapply VBC altogether.

VBC was introduced on the basis it would assist smaller developers deliver viable schemes, however the Government has failed again to build the necessary clarity into the guidance to ensure that it is only small developments which benefit from VBC.

Left to local authorities to put in place their own mechanisms provides no guarantee that VBC will assist those it was intended to; as a consequence VBC’s long-term impact on affordable housing remains potentially damaging at a time when the need for affordable homes remains critical, while the ability to rely on it to bring forward otherwise uneconomic schemes remains unclear.

Improving the use of Planning Conditions?

Too many unnecessary and overly restrictive conditions are still routinely attached to planning permissions, driving up costs and impeding development. It is against this backdrop that the Government proposed further reforms in the recently published Neighbourhood Planning Bill aimed at streamlining the use of planning conditions.

Long game

This is not a new objective. Since the Killian Pretty Review in 2008 successive Governments have been on a drive to minimise the use of unnecessary conditions. For instance, in April 2015 the Government introduced the concept of ‘deemed discharge‘, whereby an applicant can treat certain conditions as discharged if the LPA fails to reach a decision in the requisite time frame. Although the intention was admirable, it is debatable whether this reform has been effective given that the power is rarely relied upon in practice.  As we have pointed out before, part of the answer has to be improving the quality of some applications in the first place and giving a less risky route to appeal onerous conditions.

Current proposals

textThe DCLG consultation ‘Improving the Use of Planning Condition’ (the ‘Consultation’), which was launched in conjunction with the Neighbourhood Planning Bill, seeks views on the Government’s proposals to improve the use of planning conditions and closes on 2 November 2016.

There are 2 key elements to the Government’s proposals:

  1. Restriction on the use of pre-commencement conditions without prior approval by the applicant; and
  2. Prohibition of specific types of conditions.

1) Restriction on the use of pre-commencement conditions

LPAs would not be permitted to use pre-commencement conditions without prior approval by the applicant. By giving applicants an earlier opportunity to challenge unnecessary pre-commencement conditions, it is hoped that a consensus can be reached between the parties at the outset and the likelihood of appeals reduced.  Of course, there is a risk that front loading the process will lead to delays in planning applications being determined.  There are several practical implications:

  • Where an applicant refuses to accept a proposed pre-commencement condition the LPA will have a number of options at its disposal: (i) revising the condition so that it is agreeable to the applicant; (ii) allowing compliance with the condition post commencement; (iii) removing the condition in its entirety; or (iv) refusing planning permission.
  • The threat of refusal may do two things. Firstly, force applicants to consider whether they have really included adequate detail in the application itself. The answer will often be ‘no’. Secondly, accept unsatisfactory conditions in order to secure the permission (particularly where the grant of permission is a pre-requisite for the release of funds), and then use Section 73 to seek to remove the offending condition while avoiding an appeal scrutinising the merits of the entire application afresh.
  • The restrictions will not apply to outline permissions. The Consultation does not explain why.  However, the impact of delays caused by pre-commencement conditions is arguably lessened in the case of outline permissions given that development cannot commence until reserved matters have been approved in any event.

2) Prohibition of specific types of conditions

At present, LPAs have a broad power to impose “such conditions as they think fit” providing they meet the tests prescribed in the NPPF, its supporting guidance and case law.

The Government’s proposals are intended to provide greater clarity about conditions that do not meet these policy tests and should therefore be prohibited. The Consultation sets out examples of conditions that are categorised as unacceptable by existing planning practice guidance and seeks consultees’ views on whether such conditions should be expressly prohibited through legislation.

Given the relevant tests for using conditions are already enshrined in the NPPF and the example conditions set out in the Consultation are effectively prohibited (albeit through guidance rather than statute), the purpose served by this aspect of the reforms is questionable. A more productive use of this legislation would be to use the conditions as a benchmark for reasonableness, and allow binding decisions on them, via the mooted Dispute Resolution Service under the Housing and Planning Act 2016.

Conclusions

The reforms are unlikely to herald a new era in which conditions are used conservatively and pre-commencement conditions are consistently agreed upfront without the intention of resorting to Section 73. Bolder reform, providing a quicker right of appeal or up front, binding dispute resolution on this specific point, would be a much better outcome.

The risk of flooding

GLASDIR_2415520bA spate of major floods across the UK, warnings that global warming will lead to more frequent heavy rainfall events and increased risks of flooding have put the topic back at the top of the pile for planners. Recent appeal decisions have highlighted the conflict between planning policy preventing development in high risk areas and the need to build more housing, as well as the importance of mitigation strategies and conditions in securing consent.

Read the full article

This article was first published in Property Law Journal (May 2016) and is also available at http://www.lawjournals.co.uk/

 

Sun will go down on section 106BA/BC numbers game appeals

We have commented on the initial impact of the changes to the Section 106 regime made by the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 to allow developers to challenge affordable housing obligations on viability grounds.  The new Section 106BA gave developers a right to ask councils to review housing obligations.  Section 106BC gave a right to appeal against review outcomes.  Both came into force on 25 April 2013, subject to a ‘sunset clause’ killing off the changes after 30 April 2016 unless otherwise extended.  They will now die on 30 April but uncertainties remain about the transitional picture.

sunGovernment About Turn

The Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 committed to extending the sunset clause. The anticipated Order has not materialised and we understand that the Government has now decided not to do so.  This may simply be a reflection of the fact that we are no longer in recession and stalled schemes should be seen as bad planning rather than bad luck. It may also reflect the odd outcomes that have crept into the process.

Odd Outcomes

The appeal route has been widely used for schemes granted consent in the current market, on the basis of a policy compliant affordable offer or viability assumptions that have then been changed on appeal.  The ability to use the appeal route for schemes that are complete has also begun to be tested.   The recent Chatham Quays case concerned a large multi-phase mixed use scheme approved in 2007 and subject to S106 variations to push back affordable housing contributions to better times. The housing element of the scheme came forward and the commercial phase remained, as accepted by the Council, ‘largely complete’ but not fully complete.  The developer successfully stripped out the remaining payments on appeal and the Inspector’s approach was upheld in the High Court.

The judgment confirms that:

  • developments which are largely complete can take advantage of the S106BA/BC process to eliminate affordable housing requirements even though the time for delivery or payment has long passed and there is no real relationship between the obligation and whether the scheme would be completed;
  • completion should be judged by looking at the whole of a mixed use scheme, not just the housing part. The Inspector failed to consider the Council’s argument that only the housing part should be considered in a mixed use scheme, not the whole. The Judge simply held that the argument was so poor that he could never have properly accepted it if he had considered it though.  It should also be considered on the basis of whether the development is in a state which could generate receipts or return, from the point of view of the developer. Wider claims about its significance should be taken with a pinch of salt;
  • the correct route of challenge to an Inspector’s S106BC decision is by Judicial Review, not S288 statutory challenge.   This point is less novel than assumed in the judgment – it arose in 2014 in the failed Mast Pond Wharf challenge.

The judgment leaves open the question of whether a viability appeal can be entertained after a scheme has been fully completed.  Common sense would suggest not, but the judgment notes that the Act is silent on the point.

Eye of the Needle for New Challenges

We understand that the Government will allow S106BC appeals made before the sun sets on 30 April to proceed. It is hard to see how there would be any jurisdiction to deal with ongoing applications or appeals without express transitional provisions in an order (which the Act allows for).  They are needed either way, not least to be clear about the effect of the sunset clause on modified obligations where the development as a whole has not yet been fully completed, to avoid  successes like Chatham becoming pyrrhic.

It will be interesting to see whether the Government’s viability test for Starter Homes, trailing in the consultation, sets a more rigorous test than that which local authorities have faced under the Sunshine Regime.

Authorities are increasingly using planning conditions as a work around, which are outside the S106BA regime. It would be nice if this willingness to slim down bloated planning agreements survived the sunset.

Statutory consultee responses: must try harder?

In this blog, part of our series on the Government’s technical consultation on implementation of the planning changes, we discuss proposals to limit response times for statutory consultees.

Prior to making decisions on planning applications, authorities must consult the relevant statutory consultees for their opinions. Statutory consultees are under a duty to respond within 21 days, however, recent performance data indicates that in 5-12% of cases statutory consultees requested and received additional time.

scoreTo encourage authorities to reach timely decisions on applications, and minimise potential delays caused by the slow response of statutory consultees, the consultation suggests limiting requests for extensions of time to a maximum of 14 days.

The consultation asks for views on the potential benefits and risks of such a limit, and whether 14 days would be an appropriate maximum (the proposed limit is based on recent performance data which indicates most extension requests are for 7-14 days).

Limiting response times for statutory consultees is part of a wider range of measures being consulted on by the Government to encourage more ‘innovation’ and ‘radical improvement’ in planning services. Whether the changes will achieve these aims in practice remains to be seen. Shortening the timescale for statutory consultee responses will do nothing to assist applications delayed by negotiations over infrastructure provision or affordable housing. It is also unclear how forcing statutory consultees to respond faster will ensure authorities also speed up their own decision-making process.

Speeding tickets: further reforms for section 106

The Housing & Planning Bill 2015 now takes forward some of the elements of the Treasury’s 2014 Autumn Statement to speed up planning decisions. It does not pick up the commitment to introduce a dispute resolution mechanism for Section 106 negotiations to speed up housing starts trailed earlier this year (and announced in the July 2015 Productivity Plan).

The Government is still considering its options, including a combination of legislative changes and ‘soft’ measures to steer the S106 process. Our Manifesto for Planning 2015 called for a model agreement to be adopted, to limit the current reinvention of the wheel for each scheme. Once the dust has settled on the Housing & Planning Bill, there are a few further things that Government could do to nudge the process.

Dispute resolution system (DRS) challenges

The responses to the 2014 Autumn Statement reflect the challenges in applying a dispute resolution approach to planning decisions, not least:

  • sumoThe risk that DRS may drain scarce resources away from the core development management process itself.
  • What can/ should be binding and non-binding. Recognising that a DRS outcome cannot override committee resolutions means that the timing of DRS needs careful consideration. Going back to committee to give effect to a DRS decision is unlikely to appeal to many applicants.
  • Allowing DRS to be triggered before committee consideration, including binding elements (for example, on compatibility with regulations 122 and 123 of the CIL Regulations 2010) and providing incentives to behave responsibly would help.

Dispute avoidance – better behaviours

Nudging stakeholders towards dispute avoidance would be a more effective short term approach with long-term benefits, encouraging common gaps in the planning process to be plugged:

  • Far more structured Section 106 negotiations
  • Reducing the number and complexity of obligations
  • Up to date, detailed, site allocations with clear, detailed, mitigation requirements.

The last remains a pipe-dream in the current system and it remains to be seen whether the Housing & Planning Bill will really change much.

Soft Targets

Government could make a big difference now, by:

  • Adopting a Model  Section 106 agreement along the lines of the CLG/Law Society Model 2010 Second Edition. A more coherent and effective set of mechanisms for deferred/ catch up contributions would be positive.
  • Adopting Model Conditions.  There are some good Call In decisions out there with sensible, short and effective conditions that can rob Section 106 agreements of most of their content.
  • Recommending in the PPG that:
    • The Model Conditions and Model Agreement clauses are used, unless there are clear justifications for departure (and making it clear that the reasons may be subject to DRS).
    • Proper Heads of Terms or a complete Model Agreement are submitted with an application.
    • Detailed delivery programmes are agreed for Section 106 negotiations, which would finally give some purpose to Planning Performance Agreements.
  • Amending the Planning Guarantee provisions in the Fees Regulations so the ability to claw back the application fee is not lost where an extension of time is agreed but then exceeded.  That would provide the intended incentive to get on with it in the way that the NPPF and Planning for Growth require.